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ABSTRACT 
RICHMOND IRON: TREDEGAR'S ROLE IN SOUTHERN INDUSTRY DURING 
THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 
Lisa Hilleary 
Old Dominion University, 2011 
Director: Dr. Timothy J. Orr 
The American South contained few iron industries in the decades before the Civil 
War. Not until the Civil War did southern states produce significant quantities of vital 
industrial products, such as iron. Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond, Virginia, was a rare 
exception. Under the ownership of Joseph R. Anderson, the company established a 
national reputation for quality products. Prior to the war, Tredegar did business with 
northerners and with the Federal government. During the war, Tredegar became one of 
the main weapons suppliers to the Confederate military. Since this iron company 
physically and economically survived the war, Anderson regained many of his 
antebellum contracts. A few new iron industries appeared throughout the South during 
Reconstruction, but they lacked the capital resources necessary for immediate success -
capital that Anderson had less trouble acquiring. Although Tredegar ultimately failed to 
make the transition to steel, the company represented a route to industrialization not 
experienced in other southern states, making Tredegar's experience, and thus Richmond's 
experience, unique from other southern companies and cities. 
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Southern industry in the late 1830s did not exist in the same world as industry in 
the North. For many southerners, industry held no intrinsic incentive, at least not enough 
to tempt them away from agriculture. However, the increasing need to transport the raw 
materials in the South contributed to the developing transportation revolution. Railroads 
became more prevalent, and by the third decade of the nineteenth century, industry began 
to flourish in Virginia. Small iron foundries cropped up throughout the commonwealth, 
bringing an industrial component into its economy. 
Several types of industry appeared. Cotton and tobacco processing mills began 
producing small amounts of finished products from the raw materials of the region. 
Textile mills provided cloth made from the processed cotton. These mills were not so 
commercial as to offer competition to their northern counterparts, but they provided a 
new means of revenue. The iron industry also appeared to meet the needs of expanding 
railroads. Once Virginia established a market for iron products, iron foundries and iron 
rolling mills emerged to take advantage of profits resulting from the presence of railroad 
companies. Two of these companies, the Virginia Foundry Company and the Tredegar 
Iron Company, merged to form a greater iron industry, taking the name Tredegar Iron 
Works, located in Richmond, Virginia. 
Under the leadership of its commercial agent turned owner, Joseph Reid 
Anderson, the company became well established in Virginia and known to the rest of the 
South. It was one of the largest iron industries in the South before the commencement of 
the Civil War. Its size and its reputation for quality ensured its prominence during that 
conflict. Tredegar survived the war and served as a barometer of success for an 
industrializing southern city in the postwar period. The purpose of this study is to 
illustrate how and why Tredegar continued to produce and briefly prosper after the war. 
Tredegar helped to define Richmond, which was caught between the traditions of the 
South and the progressive industry of the North. 
Tredegar was unique to Richmond because it incorporated slave labor into the 
iron industry and through the business acumen and salesmanship of Joseph Anderson, the 
company survived and grew in the South during Reconstruction. Through Anderson's 
ability to adapt to changing politics, Tredegar garnered and maintained support for its 
continued production and presence in the city. Because of Tredegar's reputation as an 
iron producer before the war, Anderson quickly regained his business associations with 
northerners and with the Federal government, which gave the company an advantage 
over infant southern industries. Anderson's use of slave labor before and during the war 
provided him with support from Richmonders, and his efforts to rebuild the city won him 
acclaim across the country. This study will examine how the economy, the politics, and 
the industrial modernization present in Richmond between the 1830s and the 1870s 
shaped Tredegar, explaining why the company became the exception within the existence 
of limited and small southern industry. 
Anderson was the key to Tredegar's success. He compromised his political 
affiliations and principles to fit the needs of his company. The labor, location, and output 
of Tredegar all contributed to its thriving in the antebellum and wartime eras, but it was 
3 
Anderson who made the company unique. Eric Foner described Tredegar as being "the 
exception" to the idea that southern industry did not succeed during Reconstruction. 
Anderson himself represented this exception - as one of the youngest members of his 
family, he was forced to make his own fortune, and he did so with great enthusiasm and 
skill. His desire for a booming, successful business and a vast, individual fortune drove 
Anderson to run Tredegar in ways other southern industrialists did not favor, such as 
using politics for purely industrial ends and treating all workers equally on the factory 
floor. Ultimately, while his politics remained fluid before and during the Civil War, his 
refusal to move forward with technological progress led to a gradual decline for 
Tredegar. His role at Tredegar demonstrated that the role of southern industry during 
Reconstruction needs more attention and analysis.1 
Tredegar's story, however, charted a unique experience, countering the argument 
of the complete failure of southern industry during Reconstruction. Michael Chesson's 
Richmond After the War concluded that industry all but failed during Reconstruction, 
emphasizing Richmond's foibles in particular. The economic depression of the 1870s, 
according to Eric Foner's Reconstruction, negatively affected the entire South, including 
industry, stifling any slim progress made since the end of the war. According to Foner, 
southern industry did not succeed during Reconstruction. Banks shut down, businesses 
decreased output, and farmers suffered. Southern industry also felt its effects. There had 
1
 Charles Dew, lronmaker to the Confederacy: Joseph R Anderson and the Tredegar Iron Works 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 1-12; Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished 
Revolution, 1863-1877 (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1988), 391. 
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been a movement afoot to modernize the South, but the Panic of 1873 shut down that 
process.2 
The emphasis on southern industry during Reconstruction has only appeared 
within the last four decades. During the early 20th century, historians of Reconstruction 
focused on political and social history within the period. In 1907, William Dunning 
published a volume entitled Reconstruction Political and Economic, 1865 -1877, in 
which he stated that, "the North claims our principle attention" when addressing "the 
social, economic, and political forces" of Reconstruction. Dunning made little mention 
of the role of industry during this period, particularly in the South, where "the many 
factories which had been developed, on however primitive a scale, to supply the needs of 
the Confederate armies, were reduced to wreckage or ashes." Rather, Dunning 
emphasized the "disorganization of the labor system" for his discussion on the southern 
Reconstruction economy.3 
2
 Michael Chesson, Richmond After the War (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1981), xv; Foner, 
Reconstruction, 535. For further reading on southern industry, see Harold Wilson's Confederate Industry 
(Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2002). According to Wilson, several southern cities boasted 
cotton processing mills, but few could count an iron producer. Montgomery Iron Works of Mobile, 
Alabama and the East Tennessee Manufacturing Company had iron industries before the Civil War. Leeds 
Foundry existed before the war, but produced cotton processing tools and products. Once the war 
commenced, Leeds began producing arms for the Confederacy. The Atlanta Rolling Mill, created only a 
few years before the war, also contributed to the armament of the Confederacy through the production of 
iron for both weapons and plates for ships. During the war, the Leeds Foundry and the Atlanta Rolling Mill 
helped arm the Confederacy, but Tredegar outranked it in both size and production. Other iron foundries 
and rolling mills appeared during the war, such as Shelby Iron Works in Alabama and several smaller iron 
works in the Spartanburg area of South Carolina. Harold Wilson's Confederate Industry examined cotton, 
iron, and tobacco industries. He discussed Tredegar when addressing the iron industry in the South, stating 
that the company experienced success from its wartime contributions. His view of Tredegar followed with 
Warren Kimball's discussion in American City, Southern Place that Tredegar helped to revive the city of 
Richmond after the war. The evidence in both suggests that while southern industry generally experienced 
difficulties, Tredegar rebounded quickly and efficiently. Southern industry generally has been overlooked 
in studies of Reconstruction. Only in the 1960s did historians even begin to note the importance and the 
presence of southern industry during Reconstruction. 
3
 William Dunning, Reconstruction Political and Economic, 1865-1877, vol. 22, The American 
Nation: A History (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1907), xv-xvi, 12. 
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To Dunning, the period was one of oppressive Radical Republicans and the threat 
of "negro rule." Historians including W.E.B. DuBois and Howard Beale rose up to 
counter this interpretation, illustrating the significant role blacks played during 
Reconstruction. Revisionists of the 1940s and 1950s altered the "Dunning school" 
interpretation of Reconstruction, focusing on "social and political progress for blacks" 
after the Civil War. Again, industry, and more notably southern industry, remained 
hidden beneath the layers of political and social controversy.4 
In 1951, C. Vann Woodward published his volume Origins of the New South, 
1877-1913, discussing the importance of "regional history." A limited discussion of 
industry appeared in this book, but the focus remained mainly on the North and the 
North's role in building southern industry. Woodward stated that southern industry was 
driven, along with northern intervention, by a "moral change of heart," in which 
southerners' "will [and] ambition.. .had much to do with the speeding up of Southern 
industrialization." He briefly touched on a few of the industries developing in the South, 
and mentioned the iron industry, which he stated was "largely a hopeful potentiality" 
before 1879, when northern and English businesses began investing in the South. 
Tennessee, Virginia, and Alabama developed the most significant iron industries during 
this period, but not until 1884, so Woodward claimed, did "Southern iron make its first 
successful invasion of any extent into the Northeastern market." No mention of specific 
4
 Foner, Reconstruction, xx-xxi; Seth M. Scheiner, ed., Reconstruction: A Tragic Era (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc., 1968), 13-7. According the Eric Foner, Howard Beale originally followed 
the Dunning school, but began supporting the interpretation for which W.E.B. DuBois is credited. For 
further reading, see DuBois's Black Reconstruction in America. 
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industries appeared in this analysis because the role of industry remained significantly 
undetected - a result of the political and social emphasis.5 
Some changes to the focal points of Reconstruction occurred during the 1960s, 
starting with historian John Hope Franklin. Although only one chapter in Reconstruction 
After the Civil War discussed the role of industry, Franklin mentioned that "the ironworks 
around Richmond began to surpass their prewar importance." The majority of the 
economic discussion of the South emphasized agriculture, but the acknowledgement that 
the iron industry around Richmond already existed and was improving, suggests that 
some historians began to attribute more weight to its existence. Others, such as Harvey 
Wish's edited book, kept their focus on the social experience of blacks and role of 
political change in Reconstruction. By this point, most historians agreed that the 
Dunning interpretation had run its course, and no longer assumed "carpetbaggers and 
Southern white Republicans were wicked," nor that "Negroes were incompetent." These 
changes laid the foundation for further revisions, including the incorporation of southern 
industry in Reconstruction studies.6 
It was in this decade that Charles Dew first published his book, Ironmaker to the 
Confederacy. Although it had no introduction and no argument, Dew mentioned that he 
wanted to expand Kathleen Brace's Virginia Iron Industry in the Slave Era to include a 
more thorough analysis of Tredegar, since the company records had just been donated to 
the Library of Virginia in 1958. Dew studied Tredegar, presenting a thorough history of 
5
 C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877-1913, vol. 9, A History of the South 
(Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1951), 113,126-7. 
6
 John Hope Franklin, Reconstruction After the Civil War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1961), 177; Harvey Wish, ed., Reconstruction in the South, 1865-1877: Firsthand Accounts of the 
American Southland after the Civil War (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1965), xxxix; Herman 
Belz, "The New Orthodoxy in Reconstruction Historiography," Reviews in American History 1, no. 1 
(March 1973): 106-7.. 
an industry which "had a direct and significant impact on the history of the South and the 
nation." He commented that the previous lack of evidence accounting for southern 
industry left a hole in the discussion of Civil War and Reconstruction. He also explained 
that no historian had previously examined Tredegar because historians continued to view 
the effect of southern industry as minimal to the story of Reconstruction, and because the 
company's records only became available to the public in 1958. With this book, Dew 
helped to unravel some of the issues surrounding the role of Confederate industry. But, 
even with the publication of this book, the Reconstruction literature remained focused on 
the black experience and did little to incorporate the post-Dunning revisionism into the 
newfound attention to Richmond's iron industry. 
Around the same period some historians began publishing an increased number of 
histories of Richmond. Most of the Richmond histories from the 1960s and before 
focused on the city, and did not emphasize any industrial aspects. In this vein, Michael 
Chesson wrote Richmond After the War, which addressed the role of industry in a 
specific southern city, in "the absence of a modern history of Richmond during the post-
Civil War era." Chesson referenced Dew's book, commenting on the role of Tredegar 
within the city, and continued expanding on the role of other industries in Richmond. 
The 1960s thus put forth some questions about southern industry which historians began 
to address in the 1970s and 1980s.8 
Chesson demonstrated the importance of industry in Richmond, stating that it was 
mainly industry which determined Richmond's measured success during Reconstruction. 
He discussed Tredegar specifically, using Dew's book as a reference, stating that 
7
 Dew, Ironmaker, xi-xii. 
8
 Chesson, Richmond, xvi. 
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"Richmond's ironworks was the only one that increased the value of its product from 
1860 to 1870," showing a significant change in the interpretation of southern industry. 
While industry in the South on the whole was not addressed, Chesson and Dew made the 
point that Tredegar was a unique example in that it facilitated the social, political, and 
economic reconstruction of Richmond. But for Chesson, Tredegar's example did not fit 
the general trend. Through his research, he determined that Richmond did not reach its 
full potential as a city, remaining "a miniature metropolis." He attributed this to the 
complexity of politics in the city, Richmond's "reluctance to part with the past," and the 
decline of the iron industry in the 1880s. The textile and printing industries grew, but the 
iron industry had declined, harming Richmond's economy.9 
New historians of Reconstruction continued to deal with Tredegar as Dew and 
Chesson had done, by referring to it as an anomaly. Eric Foner approached 
Reconstruction thematically, weaving industry into his discussion of politics and race. In 
his view, few northern companies and investors wanted to risk investing in infant 
southern enterprises. Through the evolution of change during Reconstruction, Foner 
argued that southern society had to shift to accommodate the new relationships between 
whites. Politics affected the socioeconomic parts of southern society, making it difficult 
for both northerners and southerners to accept changes in their respective economies. 
The likelihood of failure ran high during this period for southern industries. The 
economy in the South after the Civil War did not offer a market necessary for new 
industries. The costs outweighed the benefits, and entrance barriers to industry were 
extremely high and competitive. But he softened the extremity of the situation when it 
came to Tredegar, stating that northerners did invest, but only "to assist reviving prewar 
9
 Chesson, Richmond, 138-9,143, 164-5. 
9 
establishments like Richmond's Tredegar Iron Works." Tredegar, he stated, had 
"attracted enough northern investment to resume production," but Anderson's company 
was an exception.10 
Foner's discussion of southern industry in general was limited, and when it 
appeared, he dealt with cotton processing mills, not iron. By not investigating individual 
industries in greater detail, Foner overlooked the contributions of Tredegar, namely that 
the company illustrated the epitome of how the urban South should have developed 
during Reconstruction.11 The company represented the outcome the South did not 
achieve after the war. Tredegar became the epitome of what the North hoped to create in 
the South, which explains Foner's exemption of the company from his blatant statement 
that industry did not succeed during the Reconstruction period. 
Tredegar ought to have played a larger role in Foner's book, for it was a clear 
example of Foner's discussion of the evolution of racial attitudes and the growing 
connection between race and class. Anderson's management of his work force 
demonstrated Foner's concept that southern whites wanted to retain control of labor. The 
increasing desire for economic independence among Richmond's blacks threatened not 
only the flow of production at Tredegar, but also affected the city's politics, particularly 
during the Readjuster period. Had Foner studied Tredegar in more detail, he might have 
1 "\ 
seen that the industry's significance could not be dismissed so easily. 
Departing from Foner's cursory approach, historians of the late 1980s and 1990s 
devoted more attention to the role of southern industry in Reconstruction. Using Dew's 
10
 Foner, Reconstruction, 213, 390-2. 
11
 Ibid., 379-92. 
12
 Ibid., 379-92. 
13
 Ibid., xvii-xxv, 535, 591-593; Perman, Political Unity, 151-6. 
10 
book, Warren Kimball wrote a history of Richmond before the war, devoting a chapter 
the role that Tredegar filled before and during the Civil War. Tredegar, according to 
Kimball, affected the labor, politics, and economic conditions of antebellum Richmond. 
He stated that Tredegar "was the city's only major business with a substantial market in 
the American South," countering Woodward's statement that no significant antebellum 
southern industry existed.14 
Harold Wilson's Confederate Industry devoted his entire book to investigating 
southern industry during and after the Civil War, and stated that "Tredegar Iron Works in 
Virginia [was a] large and successful establishment." The emphasis on southern industry 
as a part of Reconstruction illustrates both an increased recognition of the role of industry 
in the rebuilding of the South and the greater accessibility to records and evidence on 
southern industries. According to Wilson, southern industry had been growing in the 
antebellum period, and needed to continue to grow during Reconstruction. He discussed 
that the South had to increase its level of industry because "the poverty and deprivation 
of the region could be cured only by economic development," since the war had been lost 
due largely to the limited industry in the region. Wilson's focus on the role of industry in 
the South demonstrated its growing importance to the histories of Reconstruction in the 
late 20th century and early part of the 21st century.15 
Tredegar did not yield tremendous economic success, but its presence gave 
Richmond a unique advantage, particularly after the war, when industry began to 
dominate the national economy. With little industry, the South accounted for around ten 
percent of the country's economy. Although Tredegar did not contribute significantly 
14
 Kimball, American City, 159-60. 
15
 Wilson, Confederate, xvi-xvii, 272-4. 
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during the Reconstraction period, it put Richmond on the road to prosperity. No 
argument can be made that Richmond surpassed the production and success of northern 
cities, but through Tredegar, Richmond initiated a model for a successful iron industry in 
the South. 
To better unravel the importance of southern industry, this study will demonstrate 
how Tredegar came to dominate the region before, during, and after the Civil War. No 
research has been done on Tredegar during Reconstruction. Even Charles Dew's book 
stopped in the late 1860s. Kimball and Wilson mentioned Tredegar, but only up to the 
point of the immediate postwar period. Studying Tredegar during Reconstruction 
provides a more definitive look at the business practice of Tredegar - going beyond its 
antebellum and wartime success to witness its eventual decline by the late 1870s. 
Since southern industry appears in Reconstraction works from the past few 
decades, most historians accept that it, along with politics and society, affected the ways 
in which Reconstraction affected the nation. However, it remains vastly untouched, with 
issues relating to southern agriculture holding center stage of books about 
Reconstraction. Industry did, in fact, affect southern cities. To understand the ways it 
did, historians must examine individual industries created or maintained after the war. 
Tredegar is a fine example. It also held the advantage of having a forward-looking man 
at its helm. Anderson devoted everything to the development of his industry, 
compromising principles and politics to achieve greatness for Tredegar. When the 
country began to change after the war, so too did Anderson change. As the country 
reconstructed its political and economic views, industry in the South became more 
apparent and more influential. For Tredegar, the sudden change in Anderson's character 
12 
- from a man of vision and progress to a man of conservatism and resistance to change -
led to the company's decline in the 1880s. While Tredegar provides an example of how 
the South could have developed had it focused on industry, it also illustrates the 
uniqueness of how Anderson approached industry. 
13 
CHAPTER II 
RICHMOND'S "IRON KING" AND HIS COMPANY 
Tredegar Iron Works, situated on the James River in Richmond, blossomed into 
the leading southern iron industry during the middle of the 19 century. The company 
developed within a region that employed slave labor, making the factory experience at 
Tredegar unique from northern industries. The incentive of industrial slave labor, 
combined with future owner Joseph Reid Anderson's business tenacity, created the 
environment in which Tredegar thrived. Richmond Whigs supported this industry as part 
of their platform calling for internal improvements. Naturally, Richmond's Democrats, 
loyal to slave labor and agriculture, countered the Whigs' industrialism. Anderson's 
political affiliations as a Whig influenced the way he managed Tredegar, emphasizing the 
building of a local industry to support the economy. When the Whigs began to dissipate 
in the 1850s, Anderson shifted his allegiance to the Democrats, using the slave labor at 
Tredegar as the means for gaining their support. Anderson's political adaptation helped 
Tredegar and its labor force to endure the precariously shifting political environment 
through party realignment and war. 
In the 1830s, Virginia experienced a railroad boom, initiating a need for iron 
products. Throughout the decade, between ten and twenty iron foundries opened in the 
state. The need for railroad materials ensured that a market for iron products would 
remain in the city of Richmond. Richmond's location on the James River gave its iron 
companies an advantage in transportation and steam power. In 1836, furnace operator 
Francis Deane, Jr. acquired the financial investments necessary to start the Tredegar Iron 
14 
Company. The company took its name from an iron works in Wales, the home of one of 
the company's engineers.1 
Around the same time, the Virginia Foundry Company formed, and it too 
produced iron products, but its charter provided less capital than Tredegar. In 1837, the 
two companies agreed to combine their foundries under a single manager. Tredegar, 
being the larger entity, absorbed the Virginia Foundry Company, and with that, the 
merger began producing rail materials. However, the panic of that year severely reduced 
the railroad market to which Tredegar catered. By 1841, the company turned to Joseph 
Anderson as its commercial agent to get the business affairs in order. 
Anderson came from a large Episcopalian Scotch-Irish family in western 
Virginia. As one of the youngest of the family, his father explained early on that Joseph 
would have to make his own way because he would not receive an inheritance. With this 
knowledge, Anderson decided he wanted to join the Army, and finally, after much 
straggle, received an acceptance to West Point. He spent a little over a year in the army in 
the Corps of Engineers, determining from his short experience that the military life was 
not for him. He sought a civil engineering job, not the military engineering occupation to 
which he had been assigned. After resigning and returning to his native Virginia, he 
married, and then decided to take advantage of the unstable economic climate by taking 
the helm of the straggling Tredegar.3 
Anderson had become interested in industry while attending the Academy in New 
York, noting that the "economic development of the state" gave it an advantage that 
1
 Charles Dew, Ironmaker to the Confederacy: Joseph R Anderson and the Tredegar Iron Works 




 Ibid., 1-4. 
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Virginia lacked. Influenced by his time in the North, Anderson sought to build up 
Virginia's economy, and found that opportunity at Tredegar, even though his familiarity 
with the iron industry was minimal.4 He had been offered the position as Assistant State 
Engineer for the Valley Turnpike project in Virginia, coming into contact with the 
Tredegar owners at a commercial convention in Norfolk. Seeing his potential and his 
charisma as a businessman and a salesman, the owners offered him a job as commercial 
agent for Tredegar. Anderson knew next to nothing about iron production, but his 
ambition for wealth and success served the company well during those early years. 
Anderson became familiar with the layout of Tredegar, the foundry building being the 
largest building on the site. He took the position, and by 1842, began the process of 
setting up contracts with the Federal government, primarily taking contracts for the Navy 
and the Army. His efforts suffered in 1843, when several of the cannon ordered by the 
Navy Department failed to pass a test firing. The cannons were made of faulty materials, 
and blew up when tested. Thus, early on, Tredegar suffered from a poor reputation.5 
The failed products highlighted another problem within Tredegar: Anderson's 
conflict with the board of directors for the company. In his opinion, gaining approval for 
decisions from the Board set back Tredegar's progress. Thus, in late 1843, Anderson 
began leasing Tredegar, removing all power from the Board of Directors. He reacquired 
contracts with the Federal government, but now he produced iron with an improved 
process using iron from Cloverdale and Grace - a company owned by his brother John -
and coal acquired from pits outside Richmond. Once he demonstrated the quality of 
4
 Dew, Ironmaker, 4-10. 
5
 Ibid., 1-12. 
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these altered iron products, Anderson produced hundreds of ordnance materials for the 
Federal government.6 
The increase in production could not have come at a better time. The 1840s 
witnessed a boom in the business cycle. Still, the acquisition of Federal contracts served 
as the true barometer of success, in Anderson's opinion. Following the Princeton 
debacle, whereupon an experimental cannon blew up when lit, killing those around it, the 
Ordnance Bureau petitioned fellow Virginian and President of the United States John 
Tyler to find new sources of heavy artillery. Tyler, a booster for Richmond, 
recommended Tredegar as a supplier of military-grade iron. Thus, in 1844, Tredegar 
received a contract to build the steamship USS Polk. Tyler's reasons were influenced by 
the faulty operation of cannon produced by a northern iron industry, for a northern 
foundry had made the Princeton gun. This new vote of confidence from the Federal 
government, along with the growing business contracts with men in the North and the 
South, gave Tredegar an unprecedented reputation as the premier southern-based iron 
industry. The Federal government went to Tredegar for "the best cannon," according to 
the Richmond Enquirer. The New York Herald reprinted an article from the Enquirer, 
which stated that Anderson epitomized "what Virginia enterprise and talent can achieve 
when called out." 
By the late 1850s, after Tredegar had received the contract for the Polk in 1844, 
Secretary of War John Floyd required all cannon to be constructed under the Rodman 
method, which produced stronger and larger guns by allowing iron castings to cool in a 
6
 Dew, Ironmaker, 10-21. 
7
 Dew, Ironmaker, 10-16; "The Disunion Party of the South: The Resources and Preparations of 
the South," Richmond Enquirer, 4 December 1856; "Southern Manufacturing Enterprise," New York 
Herald, 13 July 1856. 
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hollow core to relieve stress on the metal. Anderson refused to use the new method, 
convinced that his method of iron production of casting in a solid tube had been working 
well since Tredegar's 1843 incident. Starting late in the Tyler administration, the 
Secretaries of War declared that all cannon sold to the Federal government must be 
produced using the stronger Rodman process. Anderson refused to make the tranisition. 
This refusal later affected the relationship between Tredegar and the Federal government 
in the 1850s.8 
While southerners generally abhorred tariffs and factory labor, Tredegar appealed 
to the Whig party's platform for internal improvements, demanding higher tariffs to limit 
foreign iron competitors. True to the national Whig Party platform, Anderson ardently 
supported higher tariffs, and in 1848, he even went to Washington to offer his support for 
a high tariff plan. The Walker Tariff posed a threat to Anderson, as it attempted to 
reduce iron duties, pushing him to support "higher iron duties." Conversely, Democrats 
in Richmond expressed concern over tariffs and the improvements of the Whig Party. 
The Richmond Enquirer, a Democratic paper, urged citizens to prepare to fight "ultra 
Whigs" who threatened the "progress [of the] nation."9 
Richmonders tolerated industry at least as early as the 1830s, when the city 
council, then dominated by Whigs, declared that "the prosperity of the city was deeply 
involved" in its enterprises.10 However, Richmonders expressed caution due to concerns 
that the city might "fall prey to the social disorder of northern cities."11 Anderson 
8
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9
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avoided Democratic criticism because he continued to use slaves at Tredegar; a decision 
that ensured his industry would remain distinct from northern industries. Anderson 
began using slave labor shortly after leasing the company, determining that to compete 
with northern factories, he must cut labor costs. The difficulty of making Tredegar 
amenable to southerners, and particularly, to the citizens of Richmond, relied on 
Anderson's ability to defend factory labor to a diffident public. Through the use of slaves 
at Tredegar, he had forged an industry that Richmonders could accept. Virginia 
contributed less to the southern agricultural economy, since the state was not conducive 
to raw cotton production (although numerous cotton processing mills existed in Virginia). 
But by the 1840s, the rise of railroads in the state and the access to coal mines pushed the 
entire state in a different economic direction from the rest of the South, acting as one of 
the city's largest employers.12 
Still, the use of slave labor caused Anderson tremendous difficulty. In 1847, a 
strike occurred at Tredegar led by white workers who protested the use of slave labor. 
Whig newspapers in the South defended Anderson's use of labor, slave and free, stating 
that while the people understood the free workers' anger and frustration, they lacked the 
right to dictate to their employer the type of labor that he could employ. One Whig 
newspaper, supporting the use of immigrant workers, went further by stating that 
Anderson's effort to remain firm against the strikers would "strengthen the feelings.. .to 
immigrate to the slave States."13 Of course, The Liberator, an antislavery newspaper 
from Boston, viewed the strike differently, using the incident as further evidence that free 
and slave labor could not be combined, arguing that, "free men instinctively shun 
12
 Dew, Ironmaker, 38-59; Daniel W. Crofts, "Late Antebellum Virginia Reconsidered," The 
Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 107, no. 3 (Summer 1999): 255-56. 
13
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connection with... 'chattel' laborers.. .because it is degrading." Anderson dealt firmly 
with the strikers, refusing to meet their demands and forcing the most recalcitrant ones to 
leave. The results of this strike solidified him as a captain of industry. He now had a 
sturdy cushion of slave labor should he need to replace any of his white workers.14 
During the 1840s and 1850s, Anderson continued using slaves to supplement white labor. 
Slaves mostly performed unskilled jobs at Tredegar, only gaining skilled positions 
immediately before the war. This increasing use of skilled slave labor proved vital, as it 
allowed Tredegar to continue production even when its white workers volunteered for the 
Confederate Army.15 
During the 1850s, Anderson began to appeal to southern state governors, calling 
on them to purchase arms from his company. He tried to alter the opinion of the 
Secretary of War, but Secretary Floyd remained adamant, informing Anderson that if he 
did not produce using the Rodman method he would lose all contracts for cannon with 
the Federal government. This loss of Federal revenue triggered Anderson's active pursuit 
of southern clients. He began to encourage pro-Southern attitudes, and became 
increasingly hostile to northern businesses because they had transitioned to the Rodman 
process and had received several of the government contracts that Tredegar had sought.16 
Anderson's participation as a member on the city council aided his efforts to 
bolster Tredegar, illustrating his popularity among certain sectors of the city's population. 
He encouraged a bill advocating the use of Virginia industries in the production of 
14
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railroads and canals. In so doing, he maintained support for his presence on the council, 
even though he did not hold a leadership position. He represented one of the five 
Richmond voting wards, and often cultivated business relationships with members 
representing the other wards. As he increased his political influence within Richmond, 
the national Party with which he was affiliated began to falter in the 1850s. 
The Whig Party in Richmond lacked the necessary cohesion to survive the Party 
collapse of the 1850s. During the 1830s and 1840s, the Whigs divided regionally based 
upon economic issues, and became more divisive in the 1850s with the conflict over 
slavery. By the mid 1850s, Richmond Whigs had grown so factional that Anderson no 
longer viewed the party as "able to protect southern interests," meaning slave labor. The 
rise of the Republican Party pressured Anderson to accept that Virginia's Whig Party 
could no longer hold out against the threat of antislavery.17 
As Whigs dissipated in prominence in Richmond, even with the presence of 
Tredegar, Anderson recognized his allegiance had to shift. His reliance on slave labor at 
Tredegar assisted him in the transition, making him palatable to his former political 
opponents. Whig newspapers accused him of betraying the party to accommodate his 
"private interests," according to the Richmond Whig, but as an industrialist dependent on 
slave labor, Anderson had strong reasons to become a Democrat. The Richmond Whig 
criticized his political shift, stating that Anderson would receive "several fat contracts" 
for moving to the Democratic Party. Evidently, Whig stalwarts viewed Anderson's 
switch as a betrayal, and they concocted stories that impugned his business ethics to 
make sense of it. By the mid 1850s, Anderson and other Richmond Democrats became 
Dew, Ironmaker, 38-59; Untitled Article, Richmond Whig, 26 May 1857. 
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the majority in Richmond's council, leaving the city's few remaining Whigs with no 
political power.18 
Anderson considered the Whig Party too weak to combat the rising Republican 
Party, so he therefore continued to push for internal improvements with Richmond 
Democrats. Richmond Democrats also fought hard to defend slavery, and slaves 
provided a large part of Tredegar's unskilled labor. After the collapse of the Whigs, 
Anderson made an easy transition to the capital's dominant party. He did not need to 
change Tredegar significantly, merely inspire loyalty to industry among fellow 
Democrats. The Enquirer printed an article describing Anderson as "a gentleman of 
great energy and business like habits," illustrating the civil respect Anderson earned 
before he joined the Democratic Party.19 
Richmond politics proved that slavery and industry could coexist successfully. 
The acceptance of Tredegar became apparent in the Richmond Enquirer, where 
acceptance of regulated banks preceded the toleration of industry. Further, during a 
"Democratic Festival" in 1852, the Enquirer reported that "a crowd gathered...around 
Mr. Grant's [tobacco] factory," showing the gradual acceptance of industry by Richmond 
Democrats. The reported statement from a New York Democrat stated that "slave 
owners are as good and merciful as other men," illustrating that perhaps some northern 
Democrats were more open-minded when considering slave labor in factories.20 
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Thus it was by 1857, just as the Whig Party faded from existence in Virginia, the 
Democratic Party emerged as a booster of southern industry. Tredegar's use of slave 
labor helped reinforce Democratic loyalty to Anderson and his company. The iron 
industry in Richmond offered a successful and unique example of employing slave labor 
in the factory system. Tredegar did not threaten the existence of slavery, making it easier 
to accept into the fold of the Democrats' platform of defending slavery. 
The Panic of 1857 challenged Tredegar with a multi-year depression. At the 
onset of the Civil War, several smaller southern railroads defaulted on their payments to 
Tredegar, forcing the company to reduce production and take loans from Richmond's 
banks. Desperate for business, Anderson had to put up the company as collateral. The 
limited Federal revenue also contributed to the financial straits in which Anderson found 
his company.21 
Sales vacillated for Tredegar after Anderson's conversion to Democracy, but 
continued to rise generally. The sale of weapons to the Army and the Navy helped 
Tredegar to weather the economic crisis, even though the relationship with Floyd was 
unstable. Anderson's refusal to transition prevented Tredegar from setting up contracts 
through Floyd for arms, but Anderson still set up some contracts with the Army and the 
Navy for other iron products, such as hardware and sheet iron, although the limited sales 
appeared in the lower numbers in the table below.22 
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Source: Data retrieved from Tredegar Sales Book for the Foundry, 1854-1860. Note: The portion from 
1860 is in Table 3. 
By 1860, Tredegar's sale of weapons increased substantially, particularly to individual 
southern states. Anderson's campaign to encourage southern states to buy weapons from 
Tredegar saved his company. Every state in the South purchased from Tredegar, buying 
rifles, cannons, shell, and shot, among other items. Of course, the southern states were 
now preparing for war, as the secession crisis deepened with Lincoln's election.23 
Although the above table illustrates that Tredegar sales fluctuated over the four year 
23
 William Freehling, The Road to Disunion: Secessionists Triumphant, Vol. II (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 330-41. 
24 
period (as with most companies), the average amount gradually increased into 1860, as 
more individual states began purchasing arms from the firm. 
By late December 1860, sales to railroads dropped significantly, as the demand 
for war materials took precedence. On December 27,1860, Tredegar and the State of 
Georgia (represented by General Paul Semmes) agreed to the issuance of shot, cannon, 
and shells, which were required to meet the standards issued by the Army Ordnance 
Department. In March 1861, a similar order was issued in a contract between Tredegar 
•ye 
and the State of Mississippi. 
During the summer of 1860, the Charleston Navy Yard in South Carolina placed a 
small order for iron plates and weapons. In December 1860, South Carolina and Georgia 
began ordering weapons from Tredegar, fulfilling Anderson's goal of acquiring more 
southern customers. Virginia and the City of Richmond also began purchasing earlier 
that year as well. The war led Anderson to believe that Tredegar's "economic future 
[lay] with an independent South."26 
Orders from other southern states allowed Tredegar to remain intact throughout 
the war. Tredegar became the major supplier of arms for the Confederate war effort. The 
most difficult problem Tredegar faced involved the lack of raw materials, preventing 
production levels from reaching their full potential. Contracts set up with the 
Confederate government allowed Tredegar to continue, but not at full capacity, which is 
24
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26
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illustrated by the sales in Table 1.27 Due to the limited raw materials available, during the 
war, Tredegar operated at only one third of its capacity. 
Whatever their opinions before the war, after Virginia seceded, Richmonders held 
Tredegar in high regard. On April 16,1861, Richmonders hoisted a Confederate flag 
atop the "main building of the works," and the Smith Armory Band played "La 
Marseillaise." Tredegar had been the first stop of a secession parade, and Anderson 
delivered a speech, applauding the use of a Tredegar columbiad at Fort Sumter. 
Governor Letcher attended as well, as reported by the Richmond Enquirer. This event 
illustrated the importance of Tredegar to the new-found Confederacy. Already, Tredegar 
had "one thousand kegs of powder and twenty thousand pounds of shot and shell" 
delivered to South Carolina at the request of Governor Andrew Pickens. South Carolina 
acquired these supplies, m addition to cannon and artillery guns. South Carolina's use 
for all these weapons and artillery from Tredegar is difficult to determine, but since the 
state had been ordering since December, Governor Pickens possessed over $3,000 in 
Tredegar-made artillery, gun carriages, and other weapons. Thus, southern purchases in 
1860 - before the war broke out - kept Tredegar afloat. 
On August 3,1861, Tredegar signed a contract with the Confederate States of 
America (represented by the Confederate Secretary of War) for shells, guns, rifles, and 
cannons. In 1862, the Confederate States government agreed that Tredegar would be 
allowed any scrap metal from the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad - after the Confederate 
27
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28
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army destroyed it to keep it out of Union hands - allowing Tredegar more access to raw 
iron. By late 1862, Anderson set up contracts with the Confederate Navy Department 
for iron, pig metal, and engines. Similar contracts continued for the duration of the war.30 
The figure below depicts the number of sales Tredegar conducted with each state 
over the course of the Civil War. 
Figure 1. Number of Tredegar Sales to southern States, 1861-65. 






























Source: Tredegar Foundry Sales Book, 1860-67. Note: Only numbers for the "State of Virginia are listed, 
although there were other purchases listed separately under the "Commonwealth of Virginia." 
As this chart illustrates, most Confederate states purchased from Tredegar at least fifteen 
times over the course of the war. Most purchases averaged in the same range of a few 
30. Tredegar Contract Book, 1859-68; Lester Cappon, "A Note on Confederate Ordnance Records," 
The Journal of the American Military Institute 4, no. 2 (Summer 1940): 94-102. 
thousand dollars, but the Confederate government purchased far more and at a higher 
frequency from Tredegar. 
Most individual sales averaged at approximately $1,000, mainly in cannon, shot 
and shell, and guns and gun carriages. On average, each individual order contained 
around 50 cannon, hundreds of shot and shells, and 100 gun carriages. Some of the 
orders were more extravagant, such as the March order from South Carolina, and the two 
separate purchases by Georgia in March and April of 1861, together totaling over 
$10,000. Virginia and North Carolina followed Georgia and South Carolina, with few 
extraordinarily large buys, but those two states consistently purchased from Tredegar 
throughout the war. Louisiana and Tennessee did not purchase often because each had 
local iron industries from which they bought weapons and artillery. Alabama, with a 
narrow coast line, had little need to purchase iron products from Tredegar (smaller 
coastal defenses), and only bought three times throughout the war.32 
The Confederate government lacked strong central authority early in the war, 
which Jefferson Davis realized after becoming the first Confederate president, explaining 
the individual state purchases in addition to Confederate purchases. Figure 2 shows the 
amount of purchases made by Confederate government entities. 
31
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CSAArmy, CSANavy Spike Factory CSA Engineer Armory Forge 
Railroad, Lab, Dept Dept Extension Repairs 
Artillery, etc. 
Source: Data from Tredegar Foundry Sales Book, 1860-67. Note: The column of CSA encompasses many 
individual branches of the government, too numerous to name, including, but not limited to the armory, the 
military store, the railroad bureau, the artillery, the laboratory, and ordnance. 
The Confederate Navy purchased materials for constructing ships, and the sales book 
clerk noted the building of a "Submarine Boat." The high amount of purchases from the 
Confederate government depicted here resulted from combining all Confederate entities 
and branches into the category, as the book listed numerous smaller departments. 
Excluded are the Navy Department, the Armory Extension and the Engineer Department, 
which merited significant purchases separate from the other branches of the 
government.33 
Purchases from the Confederate entities reached a similar range, usually doubling 
the amount of an average state purchase (about $2,000). The sales book most often listed 
Tredegar Foundry Sales Book, 1860-67. 
29 
the "Confederate States of America," and occasionally specified a specific branch, such 
as the military store, the railroad bureau, or the laboratory, which explains the high level 
of purchases in Figure 2. The Spike Factory and Forge Repairs purchased far less, 
averaging $600, but sometimes reaching $1,000 in their orders for iron. The smaller 
amount can be attributed to the fact that these two departments did not purchase weapons 
or artillery.34 
An article in the Richmond Enquirer in December 1862 illustrated the concerted 
effort of factory owners, including Anderson, to acquire and keep labor for production - a 
problem that plagued Tredegar until the end of the war. A record of the precise number 
of workers who left to join the army, or who were drafted into it, was not kept by the 
company, but the increased use of slaves at Tredegar attests to the limited number of 
white workers available. 
Table 2 below exhibits the value of Tredegar's wartime sales, with the exception 
of October through December 1864. 
34
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Source: Tredegar Sales Book, Foundry October 1860 - September 1867. Note: The Records from October 
1864 through September 1867 became Sales from the Rolling Mill, not the Foundry. Additionally, January 
through September 1860 were retrieved from the previous Sales Book, 1854-1860. 
Noticeable spikes appeared between October and November of 1862, as inflation took its 
toll on the southern economy. Sales hit an all time high in July 1864, reaching $512,000, 
but this reflected the Confederacy's 700 percent inflation rate.36 
Tredegar Foundry Sales Book, 1860-67; "Confederate Inflation Rates," Inflation Data, accessed 
22 March 2011, http://inflationdata.com/lnflation/Inflation_Rate/Confederate Inflation.asp. As stated, 
inflation heavily affected the numbers by late 1863 and into 1864. While the company continued to produce 
and sell, they did not do so to such a high capacity as the numbers in the table reflect. 
31 
Tredegar continued to operate below its capacity throughout the war because it 
used all of the available iron ore deposits, and did not have access to any other raw iron. 
This prevented the company from producing large quantities of any item. Additionally, 
while Anderson had updated equipment at Tredegar, he had still not updated to the 
Rodman process for producing cannon. While this decision cut costs, it prevented 
Tredegar from constructing stronger types of cannon. 
Regardless, the presence of Anderson at Tredegar was crucial to remain 
producing war materials. At the onset of the war, Anderson was designated a brigadier 
general, but after less than a year, he resigned his commission after being wounded 
Fraser's Farm. The reasons for Anderson's direct involvement with the Confederate 
Army remain unclear, but he immediately returned to Tredegar to resume his duties. 
Some of the managers left in charge failed to live up Anderson's production standards, 
which he discovered as army officers began complaining of the poor quality of Tredegar 
products. The Confederate War Department needed Anderson to return to Tredegar to 
ensure the cannon and other arms would be reliable, as the managers left in charge failed 
T O 
to successfully run Tredegar in his absence. 
The lack of skilled labor also became worse when the Confederate draft went into 
effect. Anderson increased the number of slaves in skilled positions, but he also had to 
turn to immigrant labor, which he disliked. Still, it took too long to retrain new 
Harold Wilson, Confederate Industry: Manufacturers and Quartermasters in the Civil War 
(Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2002), 192-6,286-90; Dew, Ironmaker, 49, 108-9.. 
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employees, especially those new to the English language. This, combined with the dearth 
of raw iron, contributed to the weakening of Tredegar's war effort. 
Before the war ended, some southerners suggested that the war was lost, and 
rallying a final campaign would be useless. This sense of foreboding suggested that 
some southerners began preparing for a Union victory before the war ended. This 
sentiment was particularly visible to industrialists such as Anderson, who had begun to 
see a decline in production and profits prior to the surrender of Confederate armies. 
Likewise, Samuel Collins, a southern financial advisor, sent word to his employer in 
February 1865 the details of acquiring currency from several state banks. Along with this 
letter, Collins included some "confidential" correspondence, reiterating that what 
followed was only his "opinion," which "should be taken with allowance."40 
Collins's opinion discussed how the war and the Confederacy fared. The point he 
sought to illustrate stated that he would not recommend investing in any southern state 
currency or bonds, as he "believefd] our cause is hopeless and irretrievably gone." If 
events continued on the same course, he wrote that he "can't see how Lee can hold 
Richmond and provision his army." He continued his letter, adding that some men of his 
acquaintance believed the South "will whip them [the Union army] yet," but he stated 
that those men have not "explain[ed] to [his] satisfaction how all this must or can be 
done."41 This further illustrated the low production at Tredegar during the war, which 
would set the tone for his determined push to start the rolling mill and foundry at 
Tredegar immediately after the war. 
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This acceptance of the North's victory permeated portions of the South in 1865, 
with Sherman having reached the Atlantic in December 1864, and with Grant hovering 
closely outside of the Confederate capital. As Collins's letter described, not all 
southerners considered the probability of a Union victory, but some had already begun to 
grow accustomed to a southern defeat. After the destruction of Richmond by fire and 
with the occupation by the Union army, the city began the process of rebuilding in 
1865.42 
Despite the political and economic changes and the conflicts within the labor 
force, Tredegar survived the economic panics and the war through Anderson's business 
acumen and salesmanship, and through his connections to the government and northern 
and southern businesses. He managed to keep a supply of raw materials and credit during 
rough financial periods. When the supportive Whig party declined, Anderson switched to 
the Democratic Party to ensure the survival and protection of Tredegar. With these 
precedents and the reputation and contracts enacted before the war, the company pulled 
through, also managing to escape significant damage or destruction by Confederate or 
Union forces. Under these circumstances, Tredegar survived the war. 
Anderson appealed to the citizens of Richmond because he was one of their own. 
According to the Richmond Dispatch, Tredegar represented a "worthy specimen of what 
can be done.. .through the skill and enterprise of our own citizens." He helped Tredegar 
out of the financial distress incurred during the 1837 panic, and continued to do whatever 
was necessary to ensure Tredegar's survival during the Panic of 1857. He used every 
resource and raw material available to keep production going, which contributed the 
increasing strength of Tredegar. These events helped prepare Anderson for the difficult 
42
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production period during the Civil War. In turn, his company's prewar and wartime 
experience ensured Tredegar's success in the postwar period, the subject of the next 
chapter.43 
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CHAPTER III 
RECONSTRUCTING TREDEGAR AFTER THE WAR 
By the time the Civil War ended in 1865, the Southern economy had been 
decimated. Much of the war had been fought in the South, and once Union troops began 
occupying the region, railroads and other industries were destroyed to disrupt the 
Confederate war effort. Richmond experienced severe inflation, only further contributing 
to the effects of economic collapse in the Old Dominion. Even with the presence of the 
iron company, Richmond encountered tremendous hardship during the road to recovery. 
Tredegar, while suffering the negative effects of the war, succeeded in recovering 
production levels and increasing the size and prosperity of the company. Anderson 
posted guards outside of Tredegar, deterring those intent on burning Richmond from 
setting fire to Tredegar. The company was one of the few buildings to remain standing at 
the end of the war, managing to escape the wrath of Union forces occupying the city and 
the wrath of Confederate forces who burned the city upon evacuation. Anderson faced 
the difficulty of regaining the company's reputation and capital, both heavily damaged by 
the war. Once Tredegar was able to produce at full capacity, it regained its hard-earned 
investments from immediately prior to the war, reacquiring government contracts. Labor 
strife persisted at Tredegar, as free and slave labor tensions disappeared only to be 
replaced by racial tensions, but Anderson managed to diffuse these issues as they 
surfaced. The combination of these factors brought Tredegar back to its prewar status as 
a significant iron producer for both the South and the country into the early 1870s. 
36 
Of the 5,000 industries listed in Virginia in the 1870 census report, approximately 
ninety of them produced some type of iron product. Additionally, twenty-eight industries 
were listed as "machinery," contributing to the railroad and boiler parts needed in the 
railroad industry. Although Virginia accounts for few of the number of industries in the 
United States as of 1870, it still accounted for more than any former Confederate state. 
The survival of Tredegar acted as a testament to the gradual rise in industry appearing in 
the South during the Reconstruction period.1 























































































Source: The 1870 U.S. Census Report on Statistics of Wealth and Industry in the United States. 
1
 U.S. Bureau of the Census, The Ninth Census: 1870 (Washington: GPO, 1870). 
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While Richmond reportedly had seventeen industries within its city limits, the industries 
there invested and accounted for much more capital than other iron industries in southern 
cities, and among these seventeen industries, Tredegar accounted for more than 50 
•j 
percent of the capital. 
Richmond survived the war, but its experience was unique. Tension between the 
Confederate government's presence and the local government's attempt to control the 
city resulted in problems of crime, food shortages, and blurred lines of power and control. 
The people of Richmond became bitter when the Confederate government took 
precedence over the city. This bitterness became pronounced during the Richmond 
Bread Riots in 1863, when men and women from Richmond and the surrounding counties 
marched to demand lower food prices - an event that escalated into a mob scene with 
violence and looting. 
As Richmond had been the capital of the Confederacy, many southerners flocked 
to it from different regions, commenting that they had come to fight "Virginia's battles" -
a phrase that embittered Richmonders toward the refugees. The urban population forced 
a blending of different regional cultures - rangers from Texas, Arkansas and Missouri 
frontiersmen, Georgia and Louisiana troops, and South Carolinian elites - from all over 
the South. While these people added to the labor force of Tredegar and its diversity, it 
changed the shape of Richmond, and affected the mentality of Richmonders after the war 
because the experience lent them exposure to the presence of people from different 
2
 The Ninth Census: 1870. 
3
 Chesson, Richmond, 25-44. 
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regions of the country, and would help during the city's occupation by the military after 
the war. The familiarity did not suggest acceptance though.4 
However, there was no general, overarching effect on the citizens of Richmond. 
Each economic class suffered different maladies; the rich from a lowered supply of 
goods, the poor from a lack of money to buy goods. Progressively, throughout the war, 
Confederate support waned in Richmond. Another factor separating Richmond from 
other southern cities after the war was desertion by the Army of Northern Virginia. As 
the Union troops approached the city, the Confederate troops fled, burning much of it in 
their wake, just as Charleston and Atlanta had been decimated by the war.5 
Richmond looked physically different after the war. The Richmond Whig 
estimated that about one thousand buildings had been burned, spreading from the 
explosion of the Confederate arsenal and the changing winds. Anderson requested and 
received the Confederate government's reassurance that Tredegar would not be burned.6 
Just to be sure, Anderson stationed workers outside of Tredegar, arming them with guns 
and giving them orders to shoot any looters or miscreants approaching the company. 
Once the fear of looting had subsided, Anderson still faced the imposing Union army, 
which occupied the city on April 4,1865. Other southern cities had been occupied for a 
majority of the war, so any wartime industry which had developed there had been 
destroyed. Union troops entering Richmond sought to put out the fires, rather than start 
them. General Weitzel, one of the Union's commanders, stated that he wanted to return 
the city to peace and order. Union troops even helped to rebuild the city after the 
4
 Chesson, Richmond, 48-9. 
5
 Ibid., 50-4. 
6
 Untitled Article, Richmond Whig, 4 April 1865; Nelson Lankford, Richmond Burning: The Last 
Days of the Confederate Capital (New York: Penguin Books, 2002), 135-9. 
devastating fires. With its contributions to the Federal government before the war, some 
Union officers understood the benefit of keeping Tredegar, rather than destroying it.7 
Thus, Union troops occupied Tredegar after the capture of Richmond, forcing 
Anderson to forfeit his company. For four months, Anderson worked diligently to regain 
control of Tredegar. Lincoln's December 1863 Proclamation of Amnesty introduced the 
"ten percent plan," under which former Confederates would be pardoned who agreed to a 
loyalty oath to the United States and to the abolition of slavery. If ten percent of a 
southern state's population did this, the state could be readmitted into the Union, with 
those who had declared their oath appointed to the state's government. Some high 
ranking civil and military Confederates were excluded from participating, Anderson 
among them. However, a small group of high ranking Richmond civil officials 
(including Anderson) met with Lincoln before the end of the war, to hash out a plan to 
end the fighting in Virginia. On April 4,1865, Anderson and some other prominent men 
from Richmond had interviews with Lincoln and some of his advisors, and tried to set up 
a legislature for after the war. Lincoln's plan would have made Anderson's readmission 
easier, allowing him to regain control of Tredegar with less difficulty.8 
After Lincoln's assassination, President Andrew Johnson's readmission policies 
were stricter, at least in theory - a part of his attempt to punish southern planters. 
Anderson applied for a special presidential pardon from Johnson because he had been a 
West Point graduate, served in the Confederate army, and "owned taxable property worth 
over $20,000," all provisions which prevented him from getting a pardon. Few 
7
 Nelson Lankford, Richmond Burning: The Last Days of the Confederate Capital (New York: 
Penguin Books, 2002), 102,133-4; Chesson, Richmond, 61; Dew, Ironmaker, 291. 
8
 Foner, Reconstruction, 35-8; Armstead L. Robinson, "The Politics of Reconstruction," The 
Wilson Quarterly 2, no. 2 (Spring 1978): 110-1; Dew, Ironmaker, 292-3. 
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southerners excluded under these statutes were willing to declare allegiance to the Union. 
Anderson, however, did not share in that reluctance, and he saw an opportunity to get 
Tredegar back to prewar production levels. He hired a lawyer to help argue his case, and 
he gained support from prominent Unionists including Governor Edwards Pierpont, Sr., 
who was appointed by the Federal government to the position after the war. The 
governor, along with General Henry W. Halleck, argued that Anderson must regain 
ownership of Tredegar because he would enable the Reconstruction government to "meet 
the needs... [of] employment and reconstruction." The request was denied by Secretary 
of War Edwin Stanton, who did not want Anderson to reacquire his company too easily. 
Stanton put Tredegar under the control of Federal marshals, but Anderson did not relent. 
He prepared a new petition later that year, now acquiring the support of railroad 
presidents, who proclaimed their desire to see Tredegar once again run by Anderson.9 
This time, Johnson denied Anderson's bid, as he did not trust men with property 
over $20,000. Again, Anderson pushed to get his way. With a letter from the governor, 
to whom Anderson had declared his loyalty, he met privately with the President to state 
his case. By this point, Johnson unexpectedly relaxed his strict pardon policy. After the 
summer in 1865, Johnson abandoned his strict pardon policy, granting amnesty to most 
southerners who applied. Eric Foner suggested in Reconstruction that it could have been 
a result of Johnson's prejudices, which had increased from "unexpected militancy" 
among blacks, or perhaps to gain the support of southerners before his second bid for the 
White House. By September, as Foner wrote, "Johnson had sufficiently satiated his 
desire to humble the southern aristocrats." Regardless, by October 1865, Anderson had 
acquired his long sought after pardon, but when he reclaimed his business, he then had to 
9
 Dew, Ironmaker, 296-300; Robinson, "The Politics," 113-8. 
41 
deal with the repayment of Tredegar's wartime debts, and reestablishing its prewar 
contacts, particularly those in the North.10 
Tredegar started producing iron goods almost immediately after Anderson 
acquired his pardon. The company continued along, attempting to exist and prosper in 
the struggling city, while continually looking for new markets of raw materials. The 
raihoad industry gathered momentum throughout the country, giving Tredegar a lucrative 
market in which to sell iron products, reverting back to its prewar customers. Some 
southern railroads began to lay tracks, but often they were supported by northern 
companies. One of the major problems for the South after the war involved the lack of 
credit and capital. Through his contacts in the North, Anderson established credit with 
some northern businesses to get Tredegar back on its feet. The prospects Anderson 
actively sought in the North did not return prewar dividends, so to supplement business, 
he began appealing to southern businesses, namely southern railroad companies. The 
South, however, had little capital to invest in any business, and usually received most of 
their capital from northerners. With the capital that he did acquire, Anderson gradually 
increased Tredegar's production, and the company's prominence in Richmond.11 
Since Tredegar survived the Civil War when most other southern industries did 
not, Anderson held a significant advantage over those in the South who not only needed 
to gain pardons from the Federal government, but they also had to rebuild their 
demolished industries. Tredegar remained intact, and Anderson's efforts came to fruition 
by 1867. Sales from January 1865 through December 1867 illustrated that the company 
did not founder, even though they had yet to reach their prewar numbers. The sales 
10
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amounts in dollars decreased tremendously between 1865 and 1866, due both to the 
19 
decline in demand of war materials and the return to federal currency. 
In the table below, the sales listed in the Tredegar Foundry's sales book 
demonstrate that Tredegar continued to produce iron wares during the postwar period. 
There was a four month gap, between April and July of 1865, when Tredegar existed 
under Federal control, but otherwise, the numbers compared with antebellum sales, and 
taking into account both inflation over time and growth of the industry. 






















































Source: Data retrieved from Tredegar Foundry Sales Book, 1865-72. April through July of 1865 did not 
have entries, and the clerk listed no notations referring to those months. Most likely, there were few to no 
sales during the period immediately after the surrender at Appomattox, which would explain this gap in 
record. 
12
 Tredegar Foundry Sales Book, 1865-72. Tredegar Iron Works Records, 1801-1957. Business 
Records Collection. Library of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia. 
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Some products were produced during the four month gap under the supervision of the 
government, continuing into August and September. By August 1865, Tredegar began 
selling products again. In October, Anderson regained control of the company, 
accounting for the jump in sales between October and November 1865. In the sales 
book, "the United States" made hardware purchases from Tredegar for a two month total 
of $6,256. Likewise, the State of Virginia purchased similar items, along with railroad 
1 % 
materials. The figures by 1867 returned to the prewar equivalents. 
The bulk of buyers during these years were railroads from all parts of the country. 
Southern railroads purchased the most, as Tredegar was the most convenient supplier of 
iron products for railroads. Northern raihoad companies had greater access to raw 
materials, labor, and cheaper supplies. This did not prevent Anderson from working his 
way up the East coast though. The customers listed in the sales book illustrated the 
expansion Anderson sought for Tredegar. During this period, he sold to such firms as the 
New York Coal Company and the Union Manufacturing Company. Local institutions 
also contributed to the clientele. The Richmond Gas Works, the Virginia Penitentiary, 
and the James River and Kanawha Canal Company took advantage of the iron from 
Tredegar to rebuild and improve their companies, spending thousands on building 
supplies. Local railroads, such as the Virginia and Tennessee, the Southside, the 
Richmond and Petersburg, and the Southern Railroad Association also purchased from 
Tredegar.14 
The company sold to non railroad companies as well. Richmond Gas Works 
became one of Tredegar's most loyal customers both during and after the war. In the 
13




postwar period, the Gas Works purchased at least once a month, usually buying 
hardware, pipes, and sheet metal. The Virginia Penitentiary also made several purchases, 
usually for the upkeep of the building. Among some of the others were the Southern 
Fertilizing Company, the Woolen Mill Factory, the Virginia Porcelain Company, and the 
Virginia Fire and Marine Insurance Company. By 1870, the Virginia Steamship 
Company began purchasing materials for the construction of ships. Tredegar sold large 
orders these years to the nearby Tuckahoe mine. Some of the heaviest purchases though 
came from companies and extensions of Tredegar.15 
The Spike Factory and the Forge Factory bought heavily from Tredegar before, 
during, and after the war. In the immediate postwar period, the Rail Mill Repairs and 
Construction Mill, the Bar and Chair Mill, the Eight-Inch Mill, and the Ten-Inch Mill 
appeared in the sales book repeated starting in 1866. By 1869, a good portion of the 
products sold went to these entities. The table below shows the sales from 1869 through 
1872, when sales began to pick up tremendously and more companies purchased from 
Tredegar. 
15
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Source: Data retrieved from the Tredegar Foundry Sales Book, 1865-72. 
Although the sales vacillated each month, never constantly increasing, the totals for the 
year show the growth of Tredegar as the 1860s came to a close. Some of the months 
appeared extraordinarily low in comparison to the months before and after. But 
purchases still appeared; often though, sales to companies consisted of lower priced 
items, usually hardware. Tredegar went through some rough periods in trying to attract 
investors immediately after the war, since many northern businesses were reluctant to 
invest in the South. Anderson had to prove Tredegar was worth the investment, and so 
had to begin producing at a low level of output to encourage investment. By 1869, 
Tredegar began heavy construction to the Foundry and the surrounding mills and 
46 
factories. Between 1869 and 1872, thousands of dollars in sales were listed as "Tredegar 
Construction," with the name appearing over 50 times. Many of the materials were sheet 
iron and hardware, although the sale of wheels became more significant by 1870.16 
At the end of each month's sales report, the clerk counted the number of wheels 
sold in that month, illustrating the importance of the product, especially with the 
constantly increasing railroad industry in the area. The table below depicts the amount of 
wheels sold each month, representing the gradual increase in both production and sales. 






















































Source: Data retrieved from Tredegar Foundry Sales Book, 1865-72. The data for January was not listed, and therefore 
does not contribute to the total for 1870, although it more than likely will still put the total below that of 1871 and 
1872. 
Tredegar Foundry Sales Book, 1865-72; Dew, Ironmaker, 310-5. 
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There was not a distinct pattern of increase among the number of wheels sold per month, 
but overall, the yearly total of wheels sold showed that Tredegar sales for that particular 
raihoad item increased, up to the year before the 1873 financial crisis.17 
As the rebuilding of the South continued, Anderson's focus broadened from 
regaining control of production and reaching prewar levels of production to expanding 
the iron works through land acquisition. Much of the private correspondence from 
Anderson around 1867 emphasized his drive to expand Tredegar. Additionally, 
Anderson mentioned his continuance of farming on a plot of land he owned in the nearby 
region, suggesting he did not merely depend on industry during the postwar period, but 
also kept this investment in land. He hired some laborers to run and work his land. 
Much of the South returned to agriculture after the war, and Anderson proved no 
different. Any participation in farming came second to Anderson's focus on expanding 
his company.18 
The success of Tredegar partially relied upon the ability of its owner to maintain a 
market for its products. Tredegar's advantage resided in Anderson's prewar business 
connections which he reinstituted after the war. The Dover Company, a coal producer in 
New York, ranked among of the most sought-after firms in Anderson's 1867 
correspondence. The sales book from the same year corroborated the prominence of 
Dover through the amount of purchases from Tredegar. Between 1865 and 1872, Dover 
Company purchased more than 70 orders from Tredegar, averaging almost an order per 
month, buying iron for machinery to mine coal. Anderson's awareness of the Dover 
17
 Tredegar Foundry Sales Book, 1865-72. 
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Virginia. 
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Company's consistency appeared in several letters during the period between 1865 and 
1872, especially with the need to purchase coal, in which he mentioned "the progress at 
Dover" was something to admire and continue to follow, as they were an important 
customer. 
Shrewdly, Anderson used his tight association with the Dover Company to broker 
new clients. In 1867, he forthrightly inquired as to Dover Company's relationship with 
the James River and Kanawha Canal Company of Richmond. Thomas Ellis, a business 
associate to Anderson and a representative of the James River firm, wrote Anderson some 
details regarding recent negations for a loan of $25,000 from the Dover Company. 
During the meeting, the Dover representatives made it clear they did not approve of the 
investment in the James River Company, because it lacked the prestige. The Dover 
representatives approved the investment because they respected Anderson, but in 
dispensing this loan, they mentioned that they could "make a dozen far more desirable 
investments, some of which [they] mentioned by name." While the relationship between 
Dover and Tredegar did not change Tredegar's southern investments, it did prove that 
Tredegar had re-established open and honest business with northern industries. It also 
demonstrated the significant grip northern businesses had within the South through the 
issuance of capital.20 
Even U.S. army officers exhibited little reluctance to invest in Tredegar. One 
army colonel requested shares, and on March 30,1868, Anderson replied that he "was 
willing to let [him] have shares enough...to pay [him] the balance [he owed] in land." 
Anderson further emphasized the need to expand Tredegar in a letter where he stated he 
19
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General Letterbook, 1867-69, Tredegar Iron Works Records.. 
20
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had "not offered the stock to anyone in Virginia," illustrating both Tredegar's 
prominence among non-Virginians and the company's dependence on northern capital. 
The capital Anderson needed came from northern businesses. Despite the initial 
reluctance of a few northern businesses, Tredegar managed to stimulate its own growth 
and gain interregional attention, largely due to Anderson's savvy business sense, which 
allowed to bend his personal morals and political convictions to achieve his goals for 
Tredegar.21 
Tredegar contributed to the rebuilding of Virginia, but some critics, particularly 
outside the South, had their doubts about its independent role in reconstructing the South. 
Those doubts originated from the perceived limited potential of the southern economy 
after the war. Investing in southern enterprises appeared risky, as the managers of the 
Dover Company as discussed earlier. Tredegar represented a conundrum - for it was a 
valid business opportunity, but it risked investing money in an area lacking economic 
stability. An 1866 letter from Assistant Secretary of the Navy Gustavus V. Fox 
illustrated this dilemma.22 
Fox requested information about Tredegar, knowing that "they have the best iron 
to make guns," but expressed uncertainty if the workers had "the skill to commence that 
work." Fox discussed his desire to leave his current position for a better opportunity 
elsewhere, and sought to determine if Tredegar would offer him that chance. Tredegar 
evidently was known to many associated with the iron industry, but a significant number 
of people did not know the viability of such an enterprise in the postwar era. Fox 
questioned "whether it is a good investment to build up." It seems that Fox did not want 
21
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the Navy to test the stability of Tredegar, for his letter mentioned that, "the Navy requires 
very few guns at present, but the Army [is] steadily at work." But Fox eventually 
changed his mind. He asked Admiral John Dahlgren for his opinion of Tredegar, and 
thus, Fox wrote a letter to Anderson that same day: 
".. .since writing you this morning, I have seen Admiral Dahlgren who tells me 
that the Tredegar Works, and the iron mines with them are in his opinion the most 
valuable of any similar ones in the country.. ."23 
While Admiral Dahlgren did not represent the general consensus of opinions on 
Tredegar, particularly with Edwin Stanton's disdain for Anderson, he offered a counter 
opinion to those businessmen and federal officials wary of investing in an unstable 
southern economy. Tredegar already had an established reputation with the United States 
Navy Department from before the war, and that business relationship may have 
influenced Dahlgren's perspective, despite the horrific fate his son, Ulrich, suffered at the 
hands of Richmonders. Those familiar with the iron industry (Dahlgren invented a type 
of naval gun) more readily understood the importance of Tredegar to the common 
defense. While Tredegar produced little in the way of ordnance, the Navy Department 
and the War Department set up contracts for other iron products, including hardware and 
iron plating.24 
Although Tredegar's sales represented one of the best indicators of its postwar 
success, so too did the success of its customers. Anderson wrote to the Virginia Central 
Rail Road Company on July 30,1867, sending his regrets in not being able to attend the 
celebration being held for the "completion of the Virginia Central Rail Road to its 
western terminal." He begged forgiveness for his absence, stating that he "shall be with 
Letter from Fox 16 April 1866, General Letterbook, 1864-66. 
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[them] in spirit," and sent additional sentiments to the company. His recognition of this 
"important event" demonstrated the unity of Tredegar and the railroad in rebuilding 
Virginia's shattered economy. Anderson commented that the event "cannot be more 
gratifying to any citizen other than myself, who have been its friend, whether in private 
life or in the performance of the city." 
This version of Tredegar's reputation differed from the perceptions held by the 
company's laborers. During the war, Anderson had begun to rely heavily upon slave 
labor to supplement the decreasing number of white workers. By the end of the war, 
slaves filled at least half the skilled and unskilled positions at the iron works. Anderson 
saw the advantage of slave labor - namely that it was cheaper, and he could use slaves for 
jobs that whites refused to do, mostly common laborers, teamsters, and mill hands. 
Tredegar competed for slave labor though, particularly as the war came to a close, and 
the military needed slaves to perform physical labor, including digging fortifications and 
setting up city defenses. However, it was the white labor that he could not hold, as many 
went into the service or fled the city. Anderson lost about half of his labor force - by 
1864, he had less than 500 workers, and had started the war with 1,000. By the end of 
the war, over half of those workers were black. Many of these black workers were also 
drafted for short periods of time to work for the Confederate army, and Anderson's 
protests against this fell on deaf ears. The black workers were returned after a period of a 
few months, keeping the company operational. This reliance on slave labor helped 
prepare Anderson for the labor struggles in the postwar period.26 
Letter to Virginia Central Rail Road Company 30 July 1867, General Letterbook, 1867-69. 
Dew, Ironmaker, 250-64. 
52 
Anderson readily incorporated African American labor after the war, since he had 
a precedent for employing white and black workers side by side, even though his workers 
tended to segregate socially. Anderson did not immediately address the racial tension 
caused by emancipation. He treated his skilled workers decently, both black and white, 
so as to ensure stable production, offering competitive wages and not pressing charges 
against strikers. 
The white workers at Tredegar held different opinions from that of their 
employer. Racial tensions among the workers became exacerbated after the war.28 
Before the war, slaves generally held unskilled positions at Tredegar. During the war, 
out of necessity, they learned skilled jobs, as fewer white workers became available to 
perform them. Working at Tredegar restricted their social lives, but they still managed to 
form close and lasting ties within their community. The lure of jobs at one of 
Richmond's industries, iron and tobacco being the most prominent, offered opportunities 
for freed blacks, and by the end of the war, the number within the city had doubled, going 
from 250 to over 500 in 1865.29 
The use of former slaves as part of Tredegar's labor force contributed to the 
success and ability of the company to get back on its feet in the postwar period; however, 
it created insoluble discipline problems on the factory floor. Northern white workers 
came to Tredegar, seeking the opportunity for employment at an all-white factory, but 
were disappointed. The presence of black workers prevented many northern workers 
from seeking employment at Tredegar, as they refused to work alongside "colored men." 
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The transition from war to reconstruction, while occurring faster than in other areas, did 
not go over smoothly in the immediate postwar period. 
The strike of 1866 represented the racial tensions experienced at Tredegar. 
Workers recruited from Philadelphia refused to start their contracted work because of the 
black presence. Anderson perhaps sympathized with these white workers, for he viewed 
black people as social inferiors, but because of his constant desire to turn a profit, he 
treated workers based on skill level, not race. Work was integrated on the factory floor, 
with blacks and whites intermixing each day. Eventually the white strike ended, with 
Anderson refusing to hire the northern men, enraging his superintendent Henry McCarty, 
who told Anderson he disliked the decision because McCarty favored the northern 
workers. Anderson did not accede to any of the demands, and offered McCarty a choice 
of leaving with a month's pay or a dismissal, ensuring that his managers would remember 
•5 1 
their place. 
Black workers at Tredegar struck as well. The Liberator reported another strike 
at Tredegar, where African American workers demanded higher wages, and were 
attacked by white workers for their temerity at making those demands. Both races felt 
persecuted, but in reality, black and white workers received comparable wages at 
Tredegar, the differences being between skilled and unskilled jobs. In both strikes, 
Anderson did not accede to any of the demands. He threatened to replace the recalcitrant 
workers, but did not bring charges against them. Anderson had no tolerance for those 
who disagreed with his labor policies, as these two incidents showed. 
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Strikes became more prevalent at Tredegar in the 1870s, with the labor struggle 
becoming a triangular conflict between management, black labor, and white labor all 
contending for power. Complicating this, black industrial workers celebrated the 
anniversary of the occupation of the Union troops, alienating the southern white workers, 
but making inroads to the northern white workers. Despite these conflicts, black workers 
remained at Tredegar. The company provided them with steady jobs and a minimum of 
$2.50 per day for skilled workers - a strong incentive in a war ravaged economy.33 
By 1866, other southern cities began to recognize the resilience of Tredegar. 
They turned to Tredegar to help in their own rebuilding process. Atlanta, seeking to 
install a waterworks to the city, sought the cost from Tredegar for production, transport 
and labor costs to produce all the materials.34 The city of Richmond also recruited 
Tredegar to aid in its rebuilding. A few years later, Tredegar's reputation continued to 
"flourish," as described in the periodical Every Saturday. The author mentioned the large 
number of orders and the amount in each, stating that "they need to be kept in operation 
day and night to supply the orders which [were] pouring in from all sections of the 
country." The publication claimed that Tredegar was the foremost producer of coal 
freight cars in the country, stating that the company had just received an order for 1,500 
cars for six raihoad companies.35 
A report in the Boston Daily Journal suggested that Tredegar had "a worldwide 
reputation," contributing to its success. The author remarked on the "devastating 
success" of Richmond, which was accounted for through the presence of "Yankee 
energy, German industry, and Scotch thrift." The enemy, the article suggested, was not 
33
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the industrialists or the former Confederate soldiers - rather it was former "dealers in 
humanity" who posed the threat to the future of the country and the reconstruction of the 
South, as former slave traders did not possess a marketable skill. A reporter for a Boston 
newspaper traveled to Richmond to write a piece on its postwar state, giving a brief 
history of the city. As he moved into the present, he explained that Richmond "was not 
as it was ante bellum [sic]." He discussed the success of industry in the city, and then 
spoke of a darker history: the slave trade. He commented that all "gallant and brave 
men" of the Confederate army were willing to repent, and it was slave traders who were 
the obstacles to reconstruction. The words offered respect for Tredegar and other 
industries of Richmond, exhibiting a relatively good opinion of Tredegar held by some 
reporters in the North. 
The recurrence of Tredegar advertisements demonstrated its prominence and its 
financial status. Advertisements for the company appeared in northern and southern 
newspapers, such as the Railway Times, the New York Herald, the Boston Daily Journal, 
and the Baltimore Sun. The placements of the advertisements attest to Tredegar's 
financial stability. They reappeared in these papers on the average of twice a month 
during the 1860s and 1870s, showing that the company could well afford to advertise 
heavily and often. On average, to run eight lines for one month in 1866, cost between 
four and twelve dollars. The rates increased if more lines were used, and if the 
advertisement extended beyond one month. One of the more generic advertisements for 
the company, appearing in several newspapers, advertised Tredegar's continuing 
production of railroad materials and iron products for ships. Engines from Tredegar 
"Waifs from Virginia," Boston Daily Journal, 18 May 1867. 
became an important commodity for the company, and were therefore prominent in the 
advertisements. 
Other newspapers, such as the Baltimore Sun, posted shorter advertisements for 
materials recently acquired from Tredegar which were for sale in local communities, or 
from the company itself. E. Pratt and Brother advertised that they were "constantly 
receiving a supply of 'Tredegar Iron Works' superior brand." These advertisements 
represented Tredegar as a company not just supplying companies and firms directly for 
projects, but the industry also acted as the supplier to smaller businesses which sold iron 
products, but did not produce them. In the San Francisco Bulletin, Piatt and Newton, of 
William T. Coleman and Company, advertised the availability of alcohol, candles, oil, 
sugar, nails, and other various items, listing the origin of each. The nails listed came 
from Tredegar Iron Works - illustrating the expansion of Anderson's company into the 
West.38 
Even as Tredegar aided in Richmond's reconstruction, the city remained strongly 
traditional in its socioeconomic capacity. Tredegar continued to do well throughout 
Reconstruction, but Richmond did not become a bustling metropolis. Anderson worked 
with northerners, but he did not represent the majority of the population. He had an 
integrated factory floor, but this did not equate to white Richmonders readily accepting 
blacks as equal counterparts. In addition to the economic constraints on postwar 
Advertisement 2, Railway Times, 12 September 1868; Advertisement, Flake's Bulletin, 3 
January 1866; Advertisement, Baltimore Sun, 10 April 1867; Advertisement, New York Herald, 27 April 
1866. 
38
 Advertisement, San Francisco Bulletin, 25 January 1868; Advertisement, Baltimore Sun, 22 
January 1867, 25 January 1867, 6 April 1867, 9 April 1867,10 April 1867. 
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Richmond, the city continued to face its personal dilemma of becoming a major 
American city and yet avoiding the appearance of one.39 
Becoming acclimated to the North and its presence required the recognition by 
both Richmond's industry and its people of northern businesses and federal officials. In a 
report of General Grant's visit to Richmond in 1866, the New York Herald reported that 
Grant had a "gratifying" visit to the city, where large groups of people "flocked to see 
him in large numbers." While there, several men of importance paid Grant courtesy 
calls, Anderson among them. Grant stayed in a luxurious room at the Spotswood Hotel, 
Richmond's most prestigious hotel. The visit became a public relations act through 
which Richmonders could showcase their progress since the Confederate defeat, putting 
on a display the happenings of postwar industry. The "becoming feelings and 
sentiments" contributed to this display, as if to suggest these citizens of Richmond 
accepted defeat graciously. Given the lengthy struggles of Jim Crow still ahead, the 
sentiments rang hollow, but Tredegar shined forth as a symbol of progress of which 
Richmonders could be proud. 
Even though Tredegar survived the war, and began producing soon after its end, 
the industry did not become one of the country's major producers of iron products. It 
regained a solid reputation with the Federal government and northern businesses, and 
eventually, a solid base of capital and raw materials, resulting from northern investments. 
The fact that Tredegar survived the war when so many other southern iron industries 
declined illustrated the potential of both Anderson and Tredegar. 
Chesson, Richmond, 87-115; Foner, Reconstruction, 213, 391. 
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Tredegar survived the war and continued into the postwar period, largely through 
the accomplishments of Anderson. He ensured that Tredegar was not physically 
damaged by the war. His ability to reestablish prewar contracts and creditors after the 
war helped the company to recuperate at a quicker pace than industries in other southern 
cities. In addition to adapting the company to the shaky environment, Anderson adapted 
the labor force to the postwar world, employing black workers in about half of the skilled 
positions after the war. With experienced labor and a capable company, Anderson and 
Tredegar made the most out of Reconstruction. His business savvy and ability to adapt to 
the changing political and economic climates both before and after the war made 
Tredegar, and hence Richmond, distinct from the rest of the South. Anderson and his 
company however were on the verge of a major shift in the industry. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RACE, RECONSTRUCTION, AND ECONOMIC PANIC 
As the 1870s progressed, and Reconstruction began to wane, Tredegar continued 
to produce, but the Panic of 1873 hit the company hard. Anderson's company suffered 
tremendously through 1877, and on a national level, the iron industry never fully 
rebounded. At the outset of the 1880s, steel gradually became the preference of railroads 
and the government. Anderson recognized this shift, and attempted to alter Tredegar to 
meet this market. The transition was too little, too late. Anderson lacked the necessary 
capital to shift his large company from iron to steel, which required large and expensive 
machinery. The Tredegar owner had plenty of raw materials and capital investment for 
iron, but not the amount necessary to transition from a labor-intensive product to a more 
capital-intensive one. The economic situation of the 1870s prevented Tredegar from 
achieving enough success to maintain its status into the next century. After the initial 
postwar success of the late 1860s, Tredegar began to decline in importance because its 
owner no longer felt compelled to make the political and economic changes necessary for 
the company's success. 
Anderson used national politics to regain control of the company and maintain 
support in Richmond by appealing directly to the Federal government for contracts. 
Investments allowed Tredegar to endure economic panics, more so than other budding 
industries. Even with these investments and the resulting sales, Anderson remained 
grounded in the Democratic Party, steering away from Republicans and Readjusters, even 
though both supported business to some extent. His resistance in the 1870s to shifting his 
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political allegiances demonstrates the changes in Anderson's outlook for his company. 
He remained dedicated to Tredegar's success, but was less willing to compromise his 
political stance and his method of production. 
The figures throughout this paper support the relative stability and gradual growth 
of Tredegar. The chart below measures the success of Tredegar based on profit. It does 
not include the effects of socioeconomic issues, nor does it illustrate the rising labor 
problems through the 1860s. However, examining the sales of Tredegar during these 
years proves the production capability and the consistent demand for the company's 
goods. 
Figure 3. Total Annual Sales at Tredegar, 1856-83. 
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Source: Tredegar Sales Books, 1856-59, 1860-65, 1866-67,1869-72. The year 1868 was not included in 
these books, and therefore does not appear on the chart, so as not to have an abnormally low sales point. 
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The sales books did not provide enough information for 1868, thus they are missing in 
the chart, but the growing numbers suggest that the postwar period was one of 
development. The noticeable dip in 1858 resulted from the Panic of 1857, when sales 
dropped off significantly, but Tredegar did not go under. The reason for the spike in 
1864 had less to do with sales, and was more the result of inflation in the Confederacy. 
The effects of the Panic of 1873 can be seen from 1873 through 1879. Finally in the 
1880s, business at Tredegar started to rebound, but once again started to fall in 1883, as 
steel's dominance trumped iron.1 
The success of Tredegar spurred other iron industries, for now Virginians realized 
that modernization must accompany reconstruction. The figure below compares how 
Virginia fared among the other southern states. Out of the country's largest iron 
producers in 1880, Virginia ranked 15th, with 55,000 tons of iron. In comparison, 
Pennsylvania ranked first, producing over three million tons. 
1
 Tredegar Foundry Sales Books, 1856-59,1860-65, 1866-67,1869-72,1873-76,1876-79,1879-
83. Tredegar Iron Works Collection. 
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Figure 4. Value of Iron Products in Dollars, 1870-1880. 
• Product Values, 1870 « Product Values, 1880 
Source: Data was retrieved from the 1870 and 1880 Census reports, using the figures from all iron related 
products. 
This data illustrates the differences in the value of iron products in the former 
Confederate states. Some of the states did not have any reported iron products in 1880, 
suggesting their manufacturing shifted to other products, such as textiles. This further 
illustrates that while industrialization expanded during Reconstruction on a national level, 
it also occurred unevenly. The immediate postwar success of Tredegar further 
demonstrates that even with the destruction of southern industry during the Civil War, 
one iron industry remained and became prosperous again fairly quickly.2 
In the 1870s, Tredegar had to meet an entirely different set of standards from 
those of the prewar period. Rather than dominating southern industry, the company's 
2
 The Ninth Census: 1870; U.S. Bureau of the Census, The Tenth Census: 1880, vol. 2 Report on 
Manufactures (Washington: GPO, 1880). 
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regionally-based reputation had to compete on a national scale. More iron and steel 
industries appeared, and while Tredegar was the largest iron industry in the South, it no 
longer held the distinction of the being one of the most efficient in the country. Also, 
Tredegar's success became irreversibly connected to the fate of Richmond, and that city 
took a decade to recover from the effects of the Panic of 1873.4 
As a result of the Panic of 1873, output declined, and Tredegar customers failed to 
pay their bills. In 1876, Tredegar was forced to shut down production temporarily, 
resulting from the "continued depression of the iron trade." This stunted Tredegar's 
output and profit levels in the second half of the decade, particularly as Anderson could 
not afford to make the transition from iron to steel. Tredegar had a strong foundation and 
an intelligent owner, but it remained at the mercy of the national iron industry. The 
company failed to enjoy a reputation the likes of which it possessed before the panic. 
Even with the investments Anderson had acquired after the war, the economic depression 
affected Tredegar severely, resulting in a lower output and a tenuous place in the national 
industry, even with Anderson's place in the city government.5 
The failure to deepen the James River near Richmond or expand the Kanawha 
Canal lessened the importance of Richmond in an age more and more dependent upon 
steamships. Constant flooding in the canal prevented it from running efficiently, and 
thus, did not achieve the success Richmonders had desired. In 1877, Anderson, still 
involved in the running of the city, proposed that instead of a canal, the city build a 
railroad following the same path of the intended canal into Ohio - an idea from earlier in 
3
 The Ninth Census: 1870; The Tenth Census: 1880. 
4
 Chesson, Richmond, 145-50. 
5
 Chesson, Richmond, 154-64; "Suspension of Tredegar Iron Works," Boston Daily Advertiser, 18 
January 1876. 
the decade among those not in favor of the canal project. He met significant objections 
from city leaders and stock holders in the canal company. Some Virginia citizens also 
objected to the raihoad, preferring to have a canal, fearing the adverse effects that 
railroads might have on their farms. Even though Tredegar had proven that railroads -
not canals - were the wave of the future, Richmonders' technological conservatism 
prevented them from reaping the benefits of Anderson's iron industry.6 
Still, iron manufacturing was more important in Virginia than it had ever been. 
Several thousand were employed in iron companies throughout the state, Tredegar 
remaining Richmond's largest employer. As of 1870, Tredegar alone employed 
approximately one thousand workers. The majority of workers at Tredegar were mostly 
native-born Americans which suggests that the company was not as dependent on 
immigrant labor since more native born workers, both black and white, were acquiring 
skilled positions in the factory. In the same census, Richmond reported approximately 
18,000 workers in its labor force, with manufacturing consisting of just under a third of 
that labor force.7 
With the increasing industry in the urban South, labor unions became more 
prevalent. According to C. Vann Woodward, unions were not all the same throughout 
the South. Some unions had strict racial distinctions (such as raihoad companies), while 
others incorporated both races (such as carpenters). The Knights of Labor gradually 
became a dominant labor union throughout the South. One of its first southern branches 
was created in Richmond, though it remained a small force there in the 1880s. Tredegar 
consisted of both types of unions, and black and white unions even reached across the 
6
 Chesson, Richmond, 145-50. 
7
 The Ninth Census: 1870, Compendium to the Ninth Census; Chesson, Richmond, 198. 
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racial divide, uniting against employers. Even though unions existed at Tredegar, the 
Knights never became a dominant force there because labor unions generally did not 
experience tremendous success in achieving their goals with Anderson in charge.8 
Tredegar did not feel the full effects of unions and strikes, as the lack of 
association among white and black workers did not exist outside the workplace. Efforts 
to integrate races in Richmond resulted in the development of a separate black 
community within Richmond during the 1870s.9 At Tredegar, at least three sections of 
the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers existed, and one was for black 
workers only. During the 1880s, the black lodge of the Association "extended mutual 
support to their white union brothers." Black unions as a result fought even more to 
acquire equality through their support of white unions at Tredegar. Since unionism and 
strikes did not affect the production of Tredegar significantly, labor struggles did not 
present an impediment to Tredegar's sales.10 
City politics during this decade also affected Anderson, and consequently 
Tredegar. By 1870, conservatism had once again become prominent in Richmond 
politics, but was tempered by Readjuster and Republican forces in the city. Anderson 
remained a staunch Democrat during these political controversies. In October 1873, in 
anticipation of the November elections, a New York newspaper discussed the state of 
Virginia, lending importance to these elections in particular because Virginians wanted to 
avoid the "unfortunate condition" of states farther South where Republicans occupied the 
8
 C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, vol. 9, History of the South (Louisiana: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1971), 228-31. 
9
 Chesson, Richmond, 145-50;Rachleff, BlackLabor, 86-108. 
10
 Chesson, Richmond, 159-61; Rachleff, BlackLabor, 70-5,101-7; For further information on this 
topic, Daniel Letwin's article "Interracial Unionism, Gender, and 'Social Equality' in the Alabama Coal 
Fields, 1878-1908" discusses the topic much more than in this paper. While the experience was similar, it 
cannot be justified that the unionism in Alabama precisely resembled that of Richmond. 
government. Democrats regained some of their power during the middle of the 1870s, 
and dominated Richmond politics by the mid 1880s.11 
Richmond's political environment grew increasingly complex during the 1870s. 
The city council remained segregated during the 1870s through the creation of the sixth 
ward in Richmond. Richmond was divided into five voting wards, but to minimize the 
influence of the black voters, the Conservative city council created the sixth ward to 
contain the entire black community of Richmond, thereby leaving the other five wards to 
white domination. This gave the council considerable leverage over the black population 
in the city. As a result of the devastating effects of the 1873 Panic, people lost faith in 
the Conservative government, so determined to repay the state debt and earn a stellar 
reputation for Virginia. These Conservatives, known as Funders, sought to relieve 
Virginia's debt through taxes. However, this procedure led to widespread discontent 
among voters in Richmond, leading to the development of the Readjusters, who 
advocated less fiscal conservatism and the repayment of debt through legislation, not 
taxes. William Mahone, leader of the Readjusters and failed raihoad owner, stated that 
the social cost was far too high in the Funders attempt to repay Virginia's debt.12 
Anderson, along with many southerners, remained conservative throughout this 
decade. While the Readjuster platform mentioned business, Anderson remained a 
staunch Democrat, strongly disagreeing with the political integration of the Readjusters. 
This sentiment added to the already present antipathy Anderson felt towards Readjusters 
for being anti-northern capital and business. The Tredegar owner very much supported 
northern capital because little existed in the South. Anderson depended on the capital 
u
 "Virginia: The Republican and Conservative Battle for Pre-Eminence on November 4," New 
York Herald, 13 October 1873. 
12
 Chesson, Richmond, 150-1,157, 160-3; Perman, Political Unity, 145-56. 
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investments of the North, and also the business contracts with northern businesses during 
Reconstruction. Previously, the Tredegar owner sacrificed all for the betterment of his 
iron business, but his proclivity to shift his political allegiance waned. He proved his 
willingness to approach the Federal government for contracts, but no longer were those 
contracts the most important source of revenue for Tredegar, clear from his contracts with 
northern businesses. The company's sales showed more business with local enterprises 
and private companies, seeking to avoid a large role in the public sector. The increasing 
demand among local businesses in order to rebuild Virginia combined with the political 
support the owners offered provided the means through which Tredegar existed with 
Democratic support.1 
By 1879, the Readjusters acquired federal positions of power, and by 1881, they 
occupied Virginia's governorship through their candidate, William Cameron. The 
Readjusters already cultivated an alliance with Republicans in the 1870s to combat the 
strength of the Democratic Party, and so acquired the support of Republicans and 
Republican voters. The Readjuster platform therefore sought to appease both the poorer 
classes, and the black voters, and advocated a smaller tax on farmers. Although they 
raised taxes for raihoads and corporations in the hopes of negating the northern influence, 
they also sought protective tariffs for manufacturing in Richmond - an attempt to appeal 
to Richmond's industrialists.14 
Readjusters supported black voters though, a position the prejudiced and 
conservative Anderson, among other southerners, could not accept. Even though the 
Democratic Party did not expressly support business, they did call for limited African 
13
 Dew, Ironmaker, 303-20; Tredegar Foundry Sales Books, 1873-1876, 1876-1879,1879-1883. 
14
 Perman, Political Unity, 151-6. 
American participation in society and politics. Anderson had no qualms in using black 
workers to make a profit, but certainly did not view them as equals in politics or society. 
The efforts to change the world around him caused Anderson to dig in his heels. Before 
the war, he easily put business before politics, but in the aftermath, he grew increasingly 
stubborn, and unwilling to adapt to changes in politics which he refused to accept, as no 
other Party option existed which would coalesce with his views.1 
During the streak of Readjustment power, blacks gained a few local offices. Two 
blacks sat on the School Board in Richmond by 1883, in addition to the displacement by 
blacks of a quarter of the city's white teacher positions. Democrats in Richmond 
watched the reforms of the Readjusters in horror, waiting for the opportunity to reassert 
their control of the local government. By the mid 1880s, the Danville race riot left 
Virginians shaken, and offered Richmond Democrats the ammunition to put the 
Readjuster government to death. Democrats used the "Negro domination," the 
incorporation of blacks, which the Readjusters supported, against them, using the violent 
Danville riot, which resulted in the deaths of whites and blacks, as a scare tactic.16 
Richmond Democrats achieved the desired result. The Readjusters lost their base 
of support, many fleeing back to the Democrats, others to the Republicans, for fear of a 
black dominated government. Although the first Jim Crow law was not instituted in 
Virginia until 1900, segregation remained much a part of the city's dynamic. The level 
of integration among workers at Tredegar therefore represented an anomaly, especially 
with Anderson on the city council. The Tredegar owner had definitive views on the 
inferiority of blacks and their role in politics, and supported segregation outside the 
15
 Rachleff, BlackLabor, 101-8; Perman Political Unity, 151-6. 
16
 Chesson, Richmond, 184-5; Woodward, History, 88-106. 
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workplace, but within his factory, the business and need for competitiveness meant using 
whichever labor would increase sales and thus profits. In Anderson's mind, segregation 
had no place on the floor at Tredegar, even though it could infest city life. 
Richmond Democrats rewarded Anderson for his steadfast loyalty. Although they 
sought to lessen the effects of the previous Reconstruction governments, they tended to 
favor raihoads and manufacturers operated by local Party heads. Although far more pro-
business, Republicans included blacks, northern whites, and southern whites who did not 
support the Confederacy. To Anderson, these sectors of political society represented the 
antithesis of his political affiliations. The failure of Republicans to follow through on 
promises to expand industry to appease an industrialist such as Anderson further 
solidified Anderson's support of Richmond's Democratic Party. Democrats considered 
the Republican Party so "unsouthern" that Anderson believed his business would lose 
1 Si 
support of locals if he aligned with them. 
What truly kept Anderson from joining the Republican Party were the radicals. 
Anderson had the support of many northern Conservative Republicans (for example, 
William Aspinwall), who sought an easy truce with the South, with an emphasis on 
rebuilding the economy (as noted in the dealings with Dover in New York). Little 
evidence suggests that Anderson in any way supported the Readjusters. While they 
supported the institution of protective tariffs for industry, they also advocated industrial 
workers' rights and the cessation of northern capital in the South. Anderson and his son, 
Archer, who took over Tredegar, lobbied hard to remove the Readjusters from politics. 
In 1885, a New York newspaper reported that Anderson's son was on a committee to 
17
 Chesson, Richmond, 184-6; Perman, Political Unity, 151-6. 
18
 Chesson, Richmond, 154-61; Perman, Political Unity, 126-31,142-56. 
offer the newly-elected Grover Cleveland some advice in returning previously held 
Readjuster seats to the Democrats in Congress. Anderson continued to use politics as a 
means of business support.19 
In the 1870s and 1880s, Anderson represented something of an enigma, for he 
represented the industrial drive of the New South, but not its modernizing mentality. 
Oft 
Most importantly, he could not make the transition to steel. Wrought iron and steel 
were produced simultaneously, and they vied for the same market during the late 19th 
century. Iron was more labor intensive - requiring a puddler and an assistant to refine it, 
and try as they might, puddlers could not shorten the time consuming process. Steel 
required more capital - meaning a Bessemer converter - but it allowed for faster 
production and resulted in a product as strong, if not stronger, than iron. Fewer laborers 
were needed to oversee this process. Thus, the labor costs of iron exceeded that of steel. 
Steel required fewer inputs (coal, for instance) than iron, so for many companies the 
change to steel was inevitable. However, steel required a tremendous amount of 
investment capital to begin. One newspaper believed that a company needed 
approximately $300,000 to transition completely to Bessemer converters to produce 
steel.21 
Anderson could not make this transition. To convert to steel, he would have had 
to remove much of his labor force and his reliance on coal. He had contracts set up with 
surrounding coal mines, such as Tuckahoe and his brother's mine, Cloverdale. While his 
19
 Chesson, Richmond, 154-61; Perman, Political Unity, 126-31; "The President Elect," The New 
YorkHerald, 6 February 1885; Dew,Ironmaker, 308-11. 
20
 Chesson, Richmond, 171-91. 
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 David Jardini, "From Iron to Steel: The Recasting of the Jones and Laughlins Workforce 
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York Herald-Tribune, 27 March 1872. 
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contracts provided access to raw materials (coal, iron ore), he did not gain enough capital 
to transition his large company to steel manufacture. Had Tredegar been smaller, he 
might have made the change, but tiansforming so large a company required more 
monetary reserves than he had available. The desire to convert to steel existed, as evident 
when the New York Herald reported that Tredegar had been in the running to gain 
contracts to cast steel guns for the Federal government. Had Anderson succeeded and 
'yy 
gained a cash advance, he would have had the capital necessary to produce steel. 
Anderson's failure to transition the company to steel products resulted in 
Tredegar's decline, but Anderson realized his error more than a decade after the Panic of 
1873 had savaged his industry. On a trip to Wheeling, a reporter for the Wheeling 
Register interviewed Anderson and his sons, asking after the industry in Richmond. 
Anderson replied that it was "very dull indeed," elaborating that he and his sons were 
"visiting the manufacturing centers of the country.. .to study the progress of the times." 
He expressed optimism about the market for iron though, stating that "good times are 
always ahead of bad times," and it would be "a mere matter of time" before the industry 
revived. Anderson had long shown a willingness to adapt, but in the 1870s, this trait 
abandoned him. His conservative approach to new technology, demonstrated by his 
lukewarm support of steel, caused his industry to drop in importance.23 
Still, Tredegar fit in with the increasing industrialization of the South. 
Economically, the company served as a mouthpiece for the "New South." Ideologically 
though, Tredegar did offer up a successful business model. Both the company and city of 
Richmond used similar strategies to regroup and recover after the war. Each reached 
22
 "Great Guns: Report of the Feasibility of their Construction," New York Herald, 31 March 1886. 
23
 "Interesting Interview with the Iron King of Richmond," Wheeling Register, 9 April 1885. 
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back to previous traditional heritages, and used them to impose stable and strong 
environments, beckoning reconstruction and credit. Richmond reached back to its 
Revolutionary reputation to validate its role in the future. Once the veil of 
Reconstruction had been lifted, Richmond realized it still had much to rebuild and create 
to catch up to the rest of the country. The capitol became what Chesson referred to as 
"the old city of the New South."24 This concept supports the evidence that Richmond 
remained unsure of its place in the post-Reconstruction world. For all it had done to 
advance iron manufacture in the antebellum period, its delay in modernizing left it far 
behind the rest of the South. Tredegar, it seems, suffered from the same outlook as the 
city. 
The production from Tredegar contributed to the role Richmond played as a part 
of the New South, although the city maintained a traditional mindset until around the 
1890s, when a new concept arose - that of the Lost Cause. Also increasing in prevalence 
were Jim Crow laws. The former affected the general mindset, but the latter shaped labor 
and politics. The first Jim Crow edict did not appear until the turn of the century, but the 
influence of segregation had been present in Richmond since the 1870s. Even though the 
Republican Party attempted to establish itself in the South and in Richmond, its members 
faced the combined front of Readjusters and Democrats. After the Readjusters went 
under, Richmond's Republicans followed, and the city remained conservative into the 
1890s.25 
The leadership of Tredegar changed in 1892 with the passing of Anderson that 
year, shifting ownership to his son Archer. Politics in Richmond remained Democratic, 
Chesson, Richmond, 172. 
Ibid., 200-2. 
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especially as segregation became a stricter part of the law. Segregation also affected the 
relationship between white and black unions which had developed during the 1880s. 
Tredegar continued to produce, but without steel production, the company gradually 
declined in importance. Anderson remained a conservative for the rest of his life, 




Tredegar did not experience the same success as the industries in the North. 
Anderson never reached the ranks of men like Carnegie or Rockefeller. He did not 
embrace technological progress enough, even though he often compromised his political 
views. Anderson's ability to adapt was limited in much the same way Richmond's 
progress was stunted. The city of Richmond remained what Chesson referred to as a 
"miniature metropolis," never achieving the potential witnessed in other cities.1 
Richmond was unique though. For years before the war, it contained an iron factory that 
utilized slave labor - a rarity in the country because southerners routinely believed that 
slavery and industry did not mesh well. Antebellum factories developed through the use 
of cheap - but free - labor, so the incorporation of slave labor at Tredegar was a singular 
occurrence. 
From his appearance at Tredegar in 1842 through the Civil War, Anderson's 
business model was unique to the South. Few other southerners had the motivation to 
enter the iron industry over tobacco, cotton, or sugar. Richmond's environment and the 
railroad boom in Virginia during the 1830s contributed to Tredegar's success, but it was 
the industry's eventual owner who would lead the company to enjoy success for several 
decades. Through political alliances, Anderson kept a steady supply of business relations 
and raw materials. His ability to put his business first resulted in his quick shifts in 
political affiliations, but he achieved an iron industry with consistent political support. 
1
 Chesson, Richmond, 141-3. For a fairly recent biography to further compare Carnegie, see David 
Nasaw's Andrew Carnegie 0Mew York: Penguin Press, 2006). 
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He was able to recognize when he needed to shift from the Whigs to the Democrats, and 
this ensured Tredegar's success.2 
Tredegar demonstrated success when examined within the context of the South. 
The company went through economic crises, shifting political allegiances, war, labor 
problems, and reconstruction. Tredegar demonstrated the expanding, yet uneven, 
industrialism experienced by the country. The financial panics throughout the nineteenth 
century all hit Tredegar hard, but Anderson's skill at retaining capital and maintaining 
production in times of crisis allowed the company to survive. The 1837 Panic hit during 
a major railroad boom in Virginia, right when Tredegar had formed and began producing 
to meet that market. After several attempts to save the foundering company, Tredegar's 
Board turned to Anderson, who managed to pull the company back from financial ruin. 
Tredegar hit another economic snag in 1857, when many of its customers defaulted on 
payments, forcing Anderson to beg the banks for loans just to let the company survive. 
The politics affecting Tredegar followed a similar pattern of ups and downs. Initially, 
Anderson was a member of the Whig Party, which supported industry, tariffs, and 
internal improvements. When the Party began to crumble, Anderson left to join the 
Democratic Party in hopes of creating a solid foundation by convincing Democrats to 
support Tredegar since he utilized slave labor. 
During the first half of the 1860s, the company had to switch its focus to wartime 
production as orders from Confederate states and the Confederate government poured in. 
This was a tremendous opportunity for expansion, but access to raw materials decreased 
by 1861, and prevented Tredegar from operating at its prewar capacity. Nevertheless, 
2
 Dew, Ironmaker, 1-21. 
3
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Tredegar ended the war mostly unscathed, able to begin production a few months after 
Union occupation. Since Anderson had posted men to protect his company, Tredegar 
survived the destructive Confederate retreat. Anderson's skill as a businessman and a 
politician came into play at the war's end, when, true to his chameleon-like political 
practices, he immediately declared loyalty to the Union.4 
The immediate postwar phase saw a quick recovery by Tredegar. Limited 
production began in 1865, and Anderson had regained full ownership by 1867. His quick 
abandonment of the Confederacy gave Anderson the ability to regain full control of the 
company, further emphasizing his dedication to the business. With the support of 
Virginia's Governor Pierpont, President Johnson granted Anderson's pardon, and within 
a few years, he had regained full ownership of Tredegar (he only had regained partial 
ownership in 1865). He remained in politics, as a member of the city council, 
determining how best to influence the city government in a way which would benefit his 
company. The Tredegar owner was able to reestablish his business's prewar contracts, 
allowing sales to steadily rise as the next decade approached.5 
As Reconstruction continued into the 1870s, Anderson used the opportunity to 
promote Tredegar using its prewar reputation for products and to regain the contracts of 
the Federal government. Many northern businesses were wary about investing in the 
South, but several still recognized the vitality of the company, including Admiral 
Dahlgren, who had every reason to express hatred toward the city which had treated his 
son's corpse so callously during the war. Even though he had been producing the 
weapons for the Confederate effort, Anderson managed to regain the business 
4
 Dew, Ironmaker 80-2, 121-32,138-53; William Freehling, The Road to Disunion: Secessionists 
Triumphant, Vol. II (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 330-41. 
5
 Dew, Ironmaker, 294-302; Foner Reconstruction, 187-91. 
associations he once had, due mostly in part to his character and ambition. Once 
Anderson gained enough investment, he was able to expand Tredegar in an attempt to 
increase production, most of which went to railroads and rebuilding the South. 
Tredegar's financial state improved as profits increased, though not rapidly. The 
devastating condition of Richmond and the southern economy after the war kept the 
success of Tredegar in check.6 
So too did the increased worker tensions in the aftermath of the war. Workers at 
Tredegar varied in race, with no specific race dominating over another. Blacks and 
whites held skilled positions. Blacks gained skilled jobs during the war, when southern 
white workers were sparse, creating insoluble racial tensions when white workers 
returned. Northern and immigrant laborers also caused problems, as many of them 
refused to work in an environment with the slightest hint of integration. Most notable 
were the Philadelphia workers, hired for Tredegar, who refused to take their positions 
because they did not want to work alongside black employees. Other strikes at the 
company involved demands for better treatment and higher wages, particularly as the era 
of labor unionism became more prominent in industries after the war.7 
The Panic of 1873 was the heaviest burden on Tredegar, particularly since it came 
when Tredegar and the rest of the South was trying to recover from the war. Production 
and profits declined; but again, Tredegar weathered the storm. Through Anderson's 
acquisition of investments during the previous two decades, Tredegar survived, but he 
never fully restored Tredegar to its prewar glory. Anderson was forced to shut down 
production briefly, and lay off over half of his labor force. The depression ruined 
6
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Anderson's chances for continuing the importance of Tredegar into the 1880s. The 1870s 
left Anderson embittered toward Republicans and strengthened his ties to the Democratic 
Party.8 
During this period, the Readjusters altered the political landscape of Richmond, 
increasing the placement of blacks in Richmond. The black community gained more 
participation in politics, although the effects of their run in politics did not last. 
Democrats regained the political majority in the city, ensuring that Anderson would 
remain a member of the party, since his interests coalesced with their platform. Even 
though both Readjusters and Republicans supported business, Anderson no longer 
compromised his political views to gain their support. Rather, he cultivated alliances 
through business, gaining Democratic support from the owners of the companies with 
whom he dealt and through his influence on Richmond's city council, which he had been 
serving since before the war.9 
When iron shifted to steel, Tredegar could not shift its production, causing 
Richmond to lose the status of the South's main industrial center. Tredegar, too, began to 
lose its prominence once steel became the order of the day. With the effects of the panic, 
Tredegar lost any hope of gaining the necessary capital to make the transition. Anderson 
made Tredegar distinct from the rest of the South before, during, and immediately after 
the war, but it was not enough to survive the economic, labor, and modernizing changes 
of the late 1870s and 1880s.10 
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Anderson continued to lead the company in producing materials for railroads and 
steamships through the 1880s and 1890s. He did not live to see the turn of the century 
though. Anderson died in 1892, with his role falling to his son, Archer. His family 
continued ensuring Tredegar's progress into the 1950s. Tredegar's reputation for quality 
provided an image of what could have been in the South, and established a legacy for 
southern industry to follow in the next century.11 
Building off of Eric Foner's assessment that Tredegar was the exception to the 
failure of industrialization in South, this study illustrates why it was the exception. 
Anderson's business savvy and his ability to adapt to changing economic and political 
climates explains how Tredegar became such an important industry in the South. Little 
incentive existed for southerners to drop agriculture and invest in industry, particularly as 
agriculture never lost its allure. Entering into an industry was expensive and required not 
only capital but access to raw materials. Few southerners shared Anderson's motivation 
to achieve industrial success. The limited access to raw materials also deterred many 
southerners from perceiving an iron industry as a wise investment. With Anderson's 
access to raw materials and his ability to gain contracts with northern businesses and the 
Federal government gave him an edge lacking in the rest of the region. 
One of the themes of Foner *s Reconstruction emphasized the transformation of 
southern society during Reconstruction. Anderson maintained avid support for his 
company through his political affiliations, allowing it to continue, and prosper. It also 
demonstrated how unique Tredegar was among the rest of the South. During 
Reconstruction, southern society underwent changes in how citizens dealt with one 
11
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another, but Anderson had become accustomed to working with northern white 
businessmen, helping him prepare for the environment after the war. Anderson had 
already begun to transform his views of society, recognizing that doing so would give 
him the advantage in making the changes of Reconstruction work for him. This ability to 
transform his politics so efficiently and his willingness to integrate labor, despite his 
racist mentality explains Tredegar's unique experience and illustrates the potential other 
southern cities chose not to embrace. 
Tredegar's story can only be explained through its owner for much of the 
nineteenth century, Joseph Anderson. The first phase from his start at Tredegar through 
1865 illustrated a businessman willing to sacrifice all to achieve success for his company. 
He recognized the potential of Tredegar, being unique to the South, and set about 
guaranteeing contracts with companies nationwide and the Federal government. When 
the business-supporting Whig Party in Richmond failed, he shifted to the Democrats, 
convincing them to offer support for Tredegar because of the company's use of slaves. 
When war broke in 1861, Anderson broke ties with northern businesses and the Federal 
government, seeing the opportunity that the Confederate war effort provided. 
After the war, again he altered his convictions, declaring loyalty to the Federal 
government, and reestablishing contracts with them and northern businesses, once more 
putting business interests first. The Panic of 1873 changed Anderson's adaptive quality. 
The depression forever ruined Tredegar's chance at national importance. Anderson 
became less likely to change his politics. He remained loyal to the Democrats, which 
also stagnated the physical growth of Tredegar. Without the support of Republicans, 
Tredegar continued to produce, but did not gain the reputation or capital necessary to 
13
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shift to steel. Anderson's opportunity to do so during the 1870s was ignored out of his 
refusal to change, costing Tredegar a nationally successful future. The adaptation which 
had served Anderson and Tredegar so well before and during the war eroded by the late 
1870s and into the 1880s. Tredegar represented what could have been in the South 





Anderson Family Papers, 1851-1879, Series VIII, Box 1187, Folders 4-10. Tredegar Iron 
Works Records, 1801-1957. Accession 23881,24808. Business records 
collection, The Library of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia. 
Samuel Collins Letter, 7 February 1865, Library of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia. 
Tredegar Contract Book, 1859-1868, Series V, Box 176. Tredegar Iron Works Records, 
1801-1957. Accession 23881,24808. Business records collection, The Library of 
Virginia, Richmond, Virginia. 
Tredegar Foundry Sales Book, 1854-1860, Series V, Box 183. Tredegar Iron Works 
Records, 1801-1957. Accession 23881,24808. Business records collection, The 
Library of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia. 
Tredegar Foundry Sales Book, 1858-1865, Series V. Tredegar Iron Works Records, 
1801-1957. Accession 23881, 24808. Business records collection, The Library of 
Virginia, Richmond, Virginia. 
Tredegar Foundry Sales Book, 1865-1872, Series V. Tredegar Iron Works Records, 
1801-1957. Accession 23881,24808. Business records collection, The Library of 
Virginia, Richmond, Virginia. 
Tredegar General Letterbook, 1844-1845, Series VII, Subseries I, Box 867. Tredegar Iron 
Works Records, 1801-1957. Accession 23881,24808. Business records 
collection, The Library of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia. 
Tredegar General Letterbook, 1864-1866, Series VII, Subseries I, Box 890. Tredegar Iron 
Works Records, 1801-1957. Accession 23881,24808. Business records 
collection, The Library of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia. 
Tredegar General Letterbook, 1867-1869, Series VII, Subseries I, Box 894. Tredegar Iron 
Works Records, 1801-1957. Accession 23881,24808. Business records 
collection, TheLibraryof Virginia, Richmond, Virginia. 
Tredegar Inventory Book, 1860-1870, Series I, Box 8a. Tredegar Iron Works Records, 
1801-1957. Accession 23881,24808. Business records collection, The Library of 
Virginia, Richmond, Virginia. 
83 
Tredegar Invoice Book, 1867-1874, Series IV, Box 172. Tredegar Iron Works Records, 
1801-1957. Accession 23881,24808. Business records collection, The Library of 
Virginia, Richmond, Virginia. 
Tredegar Units Produced, 1843-1849, Series III, Box 168. Tredegar Iron Works Records, 
1801-1957. Accession 23881,24808. Business records collection, The Library of 
Virginia, Richmond, Virginia. 
U. S. Bureau of the Census. The Eighth Census: 1860. Washington: GPO, 1860. 
. The Ninth Census: 1870. Washington: GPO, 1870. 




Boston Daily Advertiser. 
Boston Daily Journal. 
DeBow 's Review. 













Belz, Herman. "The New Orthodoxy in Reconstruction Historiography." Reviews in 
American History l,No. 1 (March 1973): 106-13. 
Blight, David. Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory. Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press, 2001. 
Breeden, James O. "The Krupp of the Confederacy: The Tredegar Iron Works." Master's 
Thesis, University of Virginia, 1961. 
Brown, Thomas J., ed. Reconstructions: New Perspectives on the Postbellum United 
States. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
Bruce, Kathleen. Virginia Iron Manufacture in the Slave Era. New York: The Century 
Company, 1931. 
Cappon, Lester. "A Note on Confederate Ordnance Records." The Journal of the 
American Military Institute 4, no. 2 (Summer 1940): 94-102. 
Chesson, Michael. Richmond After the War. Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1981. 
Christian, W. Asbury. Richmond Her Past and Present. Reprint from 1912 edition, South 
Carolina: The Reprint Company, 1973. 
"Confederate Inflation Rates," Inflation Data, accessed 22 March 2011, http-.//inflation 
data.com/Inflation/Inflation_Rate/ConfederateInflation.asp. 
Cooper, William J., Jr. and Thomas Terrill. The American South: A History. Volume II. 
New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002. 
Crofts, Daniel W. "Late Antebellum Virginia Reconsidered." The Virginia Magazine of 
History and Biography 107, no. 3 (Summer 1999): 253-286. 
Davis, James J. The Iron Puddler: My Life in the Rolling Mills and What Became of It. 
Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merril Company, 1922. 
Dew, Charles B. Ironmaker to the Confederacy: Joseph R. Anderson and the Tredegar 
Iron Works. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. 
Dunning, William. Reconstruction Political and Economic, 1865-1877. Vol. 22, The 
American Nation: A History. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1907. 
85 
Egnal, Mare. Clash of Extremes: The Economic Origins of the Civil War. New York: Hill 
and Wang, 2009. 
Fite, Gilbert C , and Jim E. Reese. An Economic History of the United States. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1965. 
Foner, Eric. Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877. New York: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 1988. 
Franklin, John Hope. Reconstruction After the Civil War. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1961. 
Freehling, William. The Road to Disunion: Secessionists Triumphant, Vol. II. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2007. 
Gagnon, Michael J. "Transition to an Industrial Economy; Athens, Georgia, 1830-1870." 
Ph.D. Diss., Emory Univeristy, 1999. 
Gutman, Herbert. Work, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America. New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1976. 
Hallerman, Dennis Maher. "The Tredegar Iron Works 1865-1876." Master's Thesis, 
University of Richmond, 1978. 
Hillyer, Reiko Margarita. "Designing Dixie: Landscape, Tourism, and Memory in the 
New South, 1870-1917." Ph.D. Diss., Columbia University, 2007. 
Hofstadter, Richard. "The Tariff Issue on the Eve of the Civil War," The American 
Historical Review Vol. 44, no. l(October 1938): 50-55. 
Jardini, David. "From Iron to Steel: The Recasting of the Jones and Laughlins Workforce 
Between 1885 and 1896." Technology and Culture 36, no. 2 (April 1995): 271 
301. 
Kimball, Warren. American City, Southern Place: A Cultural History of Antebellum 
Richmond. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2000. 
Knowles, Anne Kelly. "Labor, Race, and Technology in the Confederate Iron Industry." 
Technology and Culture 42, no. 1 (January 2001): 1-26. 
"Labor Items," Pomeroy's Democrat, 19 December 1874. 
Lankford, Nelson. Richmond Burning: The Last Days of the Confederate Capital. New 
York: Penguin Books, 2002. 
86 
Lesley, J. Peter. The Iron Manufacturer's Guide to the Furnaces, Forges, and Rolling 
Mills of the United States. New York, 1859. 
Letwin, Daniel. "Interracial Unionism, Gender, and 'Social Equality' in the Alabama 
Coalfields, 1878-1908." The Journal of Southern History 61, no. 3 (August 1995): 
519-554. 
Meyer, Peter B. "Turbulence, Inequality, and Cheap Steel." Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(February 2005): 1-44. 
Newby, I.A., ed. The Civil War and Reconstruction 1850-1877. New York: Appleton 
Century-Crofts, 1971. 
Perman, Michael. Pursuit of Unity: A Political History of the American South. Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009. 
Rachleff, Peter. BlackLabor in the South. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1984. 
Robinson, Armstead L. "The Politics of Reconstruction," The Wilson Quarterly 2, no. 2 
(Spring 1978): 106-123. 
Schechter, Patricia. "Free and Slave Labor in the Old South: The Tredegar Ironworkers 
Strike of 1847," Labor History 35, no. 2 (1994): 165-9. 
Scheiner, Seth M., ed. Reconstruction: A Tragic Era. New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston Inc., 1968. 
Smith, Page. Trial by Fire. Vol.5, A People's History of the Civil War and 
Reconstruction. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1982. 
Starobin, Robert S. "The Economics of Industrial Slavery in the Old South." The 
Business History Review 44, no.2 (Summer 1970): 131-74. 
"Steel War Vessels," Boston Journal, 6 August 1884. 
"Strike at Tredegar Iron Works," Philadelphia Inquirer, 10 October 1882. 
Tredegar Payroll Ledger, 1863-1864, Series III, Box 156. Tredegar Iron Works Records, 
1801-1957. Accession 23881,24808. Business records collection, The Library of 
Virginia, Richmond, Virginia. 
Vatter, Harold G. The Drive to Industrial Maturity: The US Economy, 1860-1914. 
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975. 
Walton, Gary M., and Ross M. Robertson. History of the American Economy (5th 
Edition). New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983. 
87 
Wilson, Harold. Confederate Industry: Manufacturers and Quartermasters in the Civil 
War. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2002. 
Wish, Harvey, ed. Reconstruction in the South, 1865-1877: Firsthand Accounts of the 
American Southland after the Civil War. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 
1965. 
Woodman, Harold D. "Sequel to Slavery: The New History Views of the Postbellum 
South." The Journal of Southern History 43, no. 4 (November 1977): 523-554. 
Woodward, C. Vann. Origins of the New South 1877-1913. Vol. 9, A History of the 





Old Dominion University 
Norfolk, VA 23509 
Lisa Hilleary was born in Alexandria, Virginia on July 7,1987, and attended 
North Stafford High School in Stafford, Virginia from 2001 to 2005. After her high 
school graduation, she enrolled at Christopher Newport University in fall 2005. In May 
2009, Lisa received a Bachelor of Arts Degree in History, with minors in Economics and 
Religious Studies, graduating cum laude, and also received the Usry Award in History 
and Departmental honors. She completed several internships over this period at the 
Virginia War Museum, the National Museum of the Marine Corps, and the Jamestown-
Yorktown Foundation, gaining valuable experience in curatorial duties and restoring 
objects in collections. She also became a member of Alpha Chi Honor Society, Phi 
Alpha Theta History Honor Society, and the American Historical Association. 
Beginning in August 2009, she entered the Graduate School at Old Dominion 
University to acquire her Master's Degree in History. During her enrollment, she was a 
teaching assistant for Dr. Robert Holden in Latin American history for a year. Lisa also 
completed an internship at the Mariners' Museum Library. She graduated from Old 
Dominion University with a History MA in August 2011. 
Permanent Address: 36 Westhampton Court 
Stafford, Virginia 22554 
This thesis was typed by the author. 
